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Chapter 1
Introduction
Prices have always been understood to have an important impact on the creation of
goods and services, but the extent of that impact has swayed back and forth as the tides
of economics have turned. At first glance, the nominal price should be nothing more than
a number that can be changed arbitrarily without distortion in the production of goods
and services. Adding a zero to the denomination of all ten dollar bills should leave the
consumer in the exact same situation as he had been previously. However, since Keynes,
these merely nominal changes in the price have been understood to have much longer and
more meaningful impacts. As the birth of Keynes and macroeconomics was more than
one hundred years ago, it would seem like there would be little left to be said about such
a critical phenomenon. Nevertheless, the information age has exposed new questions as
more precise data in the form of micro-prices has become available. The introduction of
micro-price data has led to new analyses that contribute to understanding the connection
between the nominal and the real. This study contributes to that tradition through a careful
analysis of the movement of retail prices in three separate but equally important dimensions
through the lens of one small but dynamic country with a fascinating monetary history.
Those dimensions are the frequency of price change, the relationship of prices to each
other, and the reaction of prices to external shocks, in this case, a shock to the exchange
rate.
While seemingly narrow in its subject, the use of a single, small, export-dependent
country such as Ecuador serves as a case study for investigating much broader topics
throughout both monetary economics and international finance. For example, the stick-
iness of retail prices has large and lasting impacts on the neutrality of money, a subject
covered in great detail with respect to the United States. By looking at the subject through
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the lens of Ecuador, we can observe the magnitudes of and changes in variables that are not
present in a US context. At no point in recent history has the developed world had inflation
reach the levels as we see in in Ecuador nor has it stabilized so abruptly. By looking at the
changes we can observe their impact more readily on the variables of interest to broaden
our understanding of the factors in play. All three chapters are important not just because of
the implications for Ecuador and developing nations but for the world as a whole. Ecuador
is merely the magnifying glass we can use to shed light on prices throughout the world.
Chapter 2 investigates the movement of prices. The parameter of interest here is the
frequency of price change and how this number relates to various conditions or states within
the country of Ecuador. In this chapter, my co-authors and I demonstrate that prices in
Ecuador have a structural pattern in the frequency of adjustment. As is true in all menu
cost models, firms reprice more frequently in higher inflationary regimes, but we also see
that goods that are more likely to reprice in a period of hyperinflation are also more likely
to reprice in a period of stability brought about by dollarization. These patterns are robust
across three vastly different macroeconomic regimes in Ecuador.
To explain this phenomenon, we create a menu cost model of price adjustment where
firms import goods from competitive markets overseas and use labor to distribute final
goods throughout the country. Using this model, we show that cost structure plays a critical
role in explaining the frequency of price adjustment. Movements in the price of underlying
components shift the costs of the firm and thus lead to more frequent repricing. As the
traded component is much more volatile than the wage, our model predicts that goods that
are more reliant on traded inputs will change their price more frequently than goods depen-
dent on non-traded inputs such as labor. However, the model also predicts that goods more
reliant on one component will also reprice more frequently than goods that use an equal
combination of traded and non-traded inputs. Firms that use a diverse set of inputs can ad-
just to cost shocks more easily by substituting production towards the cheaper input; they
also benefit from the benefit of diversification to the extent inputs prices are imperfectly
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correlated with each other.
Chapter 3 looks at prices and their relation to each other within Ecuador. Leaning on
the prior literature relating to the purchasing power parity paradox and the law of one price,
I present evidence strengthening the law of one price within the country of Ecuador. Using
an Augmented Dickey-Fuller test and an Im et al. (2003) test for stationarity, I find a strong
likelihood to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root. Furthermore, I estimate persistence
of deviations in the law of price to be extremely low, with half-lives on the order months.
This suggests prices within Ecuador converge more quickly compared to other studies,
especially those in developed nations.
In addition, Chapter 3 argues that because prices are a combination of both traded inputs
and non-traded inputs, this leads to a phenomenon known in the literature as compositional
bias where retail prices take on unit root properties of their non-traded input, even if the
final good is considered tradable. Under the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production
function, I scrutinize the process of combining the components into one retail price. As-
suming both inputs follow an AR(1) process and estimating parameters for each, I construct
a mapping function that shows how the time series properties of the two inputs combine
to form the final price. My results indicate that the good’s autoregressive coefficients is
not merely the cost-share weighted sum of the underlying coefficients. Instead, the non-
stationary, non-traded input may dominate the effect of the traded input, and the overall
price of the good may appear to lack stationarity even if its underlying traded component
is stationary. This paper strengthens Crucini and Landry (2017), which suggests that the
classical dichotomy still holds when applied to the input prices rather than the prices of
final goods. This classical dichotomy is weakened when looking at goods prices because
of the compositional bias involved in combining those inputs into final goods’ prices.
Lastly, Chapter 4 examines the reaction of prices in Ecuador to a shock in the exchange-
rate. This chapter shows that exchange-rate pass-through plays a differing impact in dif-
ferent cities and goods throughout Ecuador. I further investigate pass-through under the
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assumption that firms import goods from the coast and distribute these goods to the interior
of the country. I find that producer currency pricing is more prevalent in cities closer to the
coast while local currency pricing is the more applicable theory on the interior of the coun-
try. In other words, when the exchange rate adjusts, prices in coastal cities like Guayaquil
will adjust their prices to a greater degree than interior cities like Quito.
4
Chapter 2
On What States Do Prices Depend: Answers from Ecuador
with Mario J. Crucini and Anthony Landry
2.1 Introduction
A growing literature documents large cross-sectional variation in the frequency and size
of price adjustments. To date, this literature has mostly focused on idiosyncratic shocks
specific to individual firms to explain these patterns. For example, Dotsey et al. (1999) em-
phasize heterogeneous menu costs of price adjustment among firms, while Golosov and Lu-
cas (2007) and Midrigan (2011) emphasize idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Both of these
mechanisms generate cross-sectional variation in the frequency and size of price changes
but fail to address the Boivin et al. (2009) finding that sector-specific shocks are important
in explaining the frequency and size of price adjustments. In particular, they find that dis-
aggregated prices appear sticky in response to macroeconomic and monetary disturbances
but flexible in response to sector-specific shocks.
As Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) point out, there is little evidence that the cross-
sectional variation in the frequency and size of price adjustments is meaningfully correlated
with measurable statistics in the data. In this paper, we unpack some of the cross-sectional
variation in the frequency and size of price adjustments and show that the firms cost struc-
ture is an important dimension explaining this heterogeneity. Specifically, we argue that
differences in the cost structure across sectors play a central role in the price adjustment
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process.1 For instance, a hair salon will have a cost function that is relatively sensitive
to local wage conditions whereas a gas station will have a cost structure that is relatively
sensitive to the wholesale price of gasoline, which in turn is sensitive to the world price of
oil.
To study how different sectors react to a given cost shock, we develop a two-factor
menu cost model of a retail firm operating in a particular sector and selling goods or ser-
vices. Retail firms purchase traded intermediate inputs and hire local labor to make goods
and services available for final sale to consumers. To capture real frictions associated with
intermediating trade between manufacturers and final consumers, we incorporate hetero-
geneous distribution margins to create distinct pricing decision responses to an identical
shock. As in most menu cost models of price adjustment, firms hold their prices constant
until the difference between their optimal price and their current price is sufficient to justify
paying the menu cost to adjust the price. However, in our model, the inducement to ad-
just prices depends on both the size of the shock to the price of traded-intermediate inputs
and their share in the total cost of making a particular good or service available to final
consumers at their location of consumption.
We use a novel Ecuadorian micro-price panel to test and calibrate the model because
Ecuador has two attractive properties. First, Ecuador’s macroeconomic history provides
three regimes where the inflation rate, import price and wages have distinct stochastic prop-
erties. Comparing across these three regimes allows us to relate changes in macroeconomic
states to changes in the average frequency of price changes. Second, developing countries
such as Ecuador face larger external shocks to input prices which help identify the induce-
ments to changes in the optimal pricing behavior of firms in a menu cost framework.
1Other papers have considered the effect of sector-specific shocks on aggregate and disaggregate prices,
but none that we know of rely on the cost structure to explain the cross-sectional variations in the frequency
and size of price adjustments. Carlos (2006) generalizes the Calvo model to allow for heterogeneity in price
stickiness across sectors, while in the models of Gertler and Leahy (2008) and Mackowiak and Wiederholt
(2009), firms pay more attention to firm-specific conditions. Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) rely on a multi-
sector menu cost model with heterogeneous menu costs to look at impact of monetary shocks in the presence
of heterogeneity in the frequency of price adjustment.
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We first look at trends in the frequency of price adjustment to show that all firms reprice
more frequently in a higher inflation environment. While this is common in the theoreti-
cal state-dependent pricing literature, a number of empirical studies, such as Klenow and
Kryvtsov (2008), have shown that inflation and price adjustment frequencies are not highly
correlated. Our empirical results are closer to those of Gagnon (2009), who used Mexican
data to show that, when annual inflation is greater than 10-15 percent annually, the corre-
lation between inflation and price adjustment frequency intensifies. Put differently, when
inflation changes by a substantial amount—as is certainly true in Ecuador and Mexico—it
is easier to detect the positive relationship between aggregate inflation and average price
adjustment frequencies. In mild inflationary environments, idiosyncratic factors specific to
particular goods or markets obscure the impact of aggregate inflation.
Our second and more novel finding relates to differences in the frequency of price
adjustment across sectors within a given inflationary regime. Sectors in the context of
retail prices are categories of consumer products (food, clothing, housing and so forth).
An emerging literature establishes that individual consumer goods differ significantly in
the cost-share of distribution, the difference between what consumers pay and producers
receive. In our micro-data the distribution share ranges from 0.2 for gasoline to a high
of 0.85 for a haircut. As Crucini and Landry (2017) note, this effectively means the non-
traded factor content (distribution costs) of haircuts is 4.25 times that of gasoline. Because
wages are less volatile than traded inputs, our state-dependent pricing model will predict
that haircuts reprice less frequently than does gasoline. A more subtle prediction of this
two input model of retail goods is that haircuts need not be the good with the stickiest
price. This is due to the fact that a more diversified cost profile (e.g., goods that do not rely
mostly on a single factor input) has a lower unconditional variance than the cost function
of haircuts. These properties influence the shape of a firm’s optimal pricing function and
are borne out in our micro-data from Ecuador.
This paper elucidates the states upon which a firm’s price depends. Our results show
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that the widespread perception that state-dependent pricing models fail to account for cross-
sectional heterogeneity in the frequency of price changes is an artifact of assuming symme-
try of the cost function for consumer goods in terms of their traded factor content. More-
over, while it is understandably tempting to adapt models by adding idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shocks at the firm level, such an approach may serve to obscure the key states upon
which costs and firm pricing decisions depend. In contrast, our parsimonious treatment of
distribution costs with a two-shock model allows a direct point of contact with the focus
of policymakers attempting to divine the differences between core and overall inflation.
While the relevance of our model is demonstrated in the case of Ecuador, our findings are
likely to carry over to more stable, low-inflation environments. For example, our model
provides a natural explanation for the relatively frequent and volatile movements in food
and energy, sectors that epitomize our definition of retail goods high in traded input content
on a cost basis.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the context for using Ecuador
as a natural experiment and presents key stylized facts from the data. Section 3 lays out
the theoretical framework we use to generate a set of predictions for how prices should
respond, given the state of macroeconomic conditions in Ecuador. In Section 4, we cali-
brate and simulate the model to assess its ability to capture salient features of the observed
frequencies of price changes across goods for three distinct inflationary environments ex-
perienced in Ecuador. Section 5 concludes.
2.2 A Brief Monetary History of Ecuador
In this section, we review Ecuadorian monetary history from 1997 to 2003 to give
context to the model and to introduce key stylized facts that help motivate our analy-
sis. We show that the cross-sectional (i.e., good-specific) distribution of the frequency
of price changes exhibits remarkable stability even as Ecuador moves from a hyperinfla-
tionary regime to a modest inflation regime (dollarization). This pattern will serve as a key
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motivation for the model presented in Section 3.
2.2.1 The Data
Our main source of data is a monthly database of retail prices from the National In-
stitute of Statistics and Census (INEC), the official national statistical agency of Ecuador
and a subdivision of its central bank. These data comprise monthly retail prices from
1997 to 2003 in 12 different Ecuadorian cities spanning both the Western Coastal region
and the Central Sierra region, including both the country’s capital, Quito, and largest city,
Guayaquil. These prices cover a wide variety of goods and services. The data are described
in detail in Penaloza-Pesantes (2005).2
Our second source of data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis Personal Con-
sumption Expenditure Bridge Tables (1992). These tables show the value of consumer
expenditures by expenditure category in producers’ and purchasers’ prices. The macroe-
conomic literature refers to this as the distribution share: the difference between what con-
sumers pay and what producers receive divided by what consumers pay. For example, if
final consumption expenditure on bread is $1.00 and bread producers receive $0.64, the
distribution share is 0.36. This share includes wholesale and retail services, marketing and
advertisement, local transportation services and markups.
For services, however, this is problematic as a measure of the traded inputs in final
consumption. The reason is simple: according to these tables, what consumers pay and
what producers receive for a service is the same. Conceptually, this is inconsistent with
the approach used for goods. For example, when a consumer (or that consumer’s health
insurance provider) receives a medical bill, the charges may include wage compensation
for the physician and the cost of goods and non-physician services included in the overall
treatment, whether or not it is itemized on the invoice. Since the doctors’ services are
2The Ecuadorian micro-price panel was obtained from INEC by Penaloza-Pesantes (2005) who studied
Ecuadorian real exchange rates with respect to the United States in his Ph.D. dissertation.
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local inputs while the goods used in production of medical services are traded inputs, it is
necessary to separate the two. For this reason we use the 1990 U.S. input-output data to
measure the non-traded and traded factor content of services.
In this paper, the distribution share is the cost-share percentage of non-traded inputs
in production. After assigning each retail item in the Ecuadorian micro-price survey to an
expenditure category found in the U.S. PCE data we have a distribution cost-share for that
item. The goods and services covered in this retail price database are representative of the
full span of household expenditure patterns. Consequently, distribution shares vary widely,
from an automobile with a non-traded input share of only 0.167 to postage for a letter,
which has a non-traded input share of 1. The median across the 223 goods and services
in the Ecuadorian micro-panel is 0.52. The distribution share for each good and service is
listed in Appendix A.
Overall, our distribution shares are similar to those used in Burstein et al. (2003a) and
Goldberg and Campa (2010). Instead of estimating the size of the distribution sector us-
ing aggregate data, Berger et al. (2012) measured the distribution shares using U.S. retail
and import prices of specific items from the U.S. CPI and producer price index (PPI) data.
They find that the distribution shares in these data are larger (on average) than the estimates
reported for U.S. consumption goods using aggregate data. Their median U.S. distribution
shares across all items in their cross-section is 0.57 for imports priced on a c.i.f. (cost, in-
surance, and freight) basis and 0.68 for imports priced on an f.o.b. (freight-on-board) basis.
While their dataset allows for a more disaggregated calculation of the distribution shares,
it does not include services, which constitutes a large fraction of consumption expenditure.
Importantly for our results, Burstein et al. (2003a) and Berger et al. (2012) found that the
distribution shares are stable over time.
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2.2.2 Three Inflation Regimes
Our panel data of retail prices span the period from January 1997 to April 2003. These
years represent a tumultuous period in Ecuadorian history spanning three distinct inflation
regimes. The first regime is referred to as the Moderate regime and represents a period of
moderate and stable inflation. At this time, Ecuador was on a crawling peg to the US dollar,
and although Ecuador’s monthly inflation rate of 2.2 percent seems high compared with a
developed country like the United States, it was typical for a Latin American country over
this time period.
In mid-1998, Ecuador was hit with a series of exogenous, negative shocks. El Nin˜o had
negative effects on agriculture and the warming trend reduced the price of oil, an important
Ecuadorian export. Only a year prior, the Asian financial crisis appeared to leave devel-
oping and emerging markets susceptible to capital flight. Ecuadorian GDP per capita fell
by more than 7 percent from 1998 to 1999. During this second regime, which we call the
Crisis regime, Ecuador experienced hyperinflation with inflation averaging approximately
4.7 percent per month, contributing to further paralysis of the economy.
Unable to rein in inflation using standard monetary policy actions, in January 2001, the
Ecuadorian government announced that it would replace the Sucre with the US dollar for
all retail transactions. The results of dollarization were impressive, with inflation falling
from 4.7 percent to a mere 1.1 percent per month between 2001 and 2003, the end point of
our sample.
Figure 2.1 plots our monthly inflation measure together with INEC’s official Consumer
Price Index. Our measure is an equally weighted average of inflation across all goods and
cities. Comparing the two lines, it is obvious that our simple construct tracks the official
CPI almost exactly. The inflation rate time series is shown in three colors to distinguish
each inflation regime: blue for Regime 1 (Moderate regime), red for Regime 2 (the period
of financial and exchange rate crisis known as the Crisis regime), and green for Regime 3
(the Dollarization regime).
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Figure 2.1: Monthly CPI Inflation in Ecuador by Regime
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Note: Monthly inflation rate over the sample period of January 1998 to April 2003, calculated as an equally
weighted average of inflation across all goods and cities from our dataset. The black line represents the
official CPI from INEC, Ecuador’s national statistical agency.
Table 2.1 presents our summary statistics across the three inflation regimes. The first
row conveys the narrative history of inflation in Ecuador. In the first regime, inflation is very
high compared with industrial countries, averaging 2.2 percent per month. In the second
regime, during the financial and exchange rate crisis, inflation reaches hyperinflationary
levels. The average is a bit deceptive in the sense that some inflationary spikes extended to
more than 10 percent per month. The inflationary situation moderated in the third regime,
with inflation stabilizing to 1.1 percent per month, presumably as a consequence of the
dollarization together with a commitment to open trade and integration with international
capital markets.
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Table 2.1: Summary of Monthly Price Facts
Full sample Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Moderate regime Crisis regime Dollarization regime
1997:01-2003:04 1997:01-1998:07 1998:08-2000:12 2001:01-2003:04
Mean inflation 2.8% 2.2% 4.7% 1.1%
Price adjustment frequency 57.6% 53.9% 67.3% 50.0%
Price increases 43.2% 42.7% 54.3% 32.1%
Price declines 14.4% 11.3% 13.0% 17.9%
Size of price changes 9.1% 7.8% 11.1% 7.4%
Note: Mean inflation and price adjustment frequency are statistics across goods, cities, and time periods.The
size of price changes are average absolute values across goods, cities, and time periods.
2.2.3 Price Changes in Ecuador
We now turn to individual prices and present new stylized facts observed in our novel
data set. To help answer our question about the states upon which price adjustment depend,
we begin with an analysis of the frequencies of price changes in Ecuador. Looking at Table
2.1, we see higher inflation periods are also periods with more frequent price changes
consistent with a state-dependent or menu cost theory of price adjustment. We see this
pattern consistently across the three regimes of our sample with the average frequency of
price changes increasing from 50 percent (Regime 3) to 53.9 percent (Regime 1) and then
to 67.3 percent (Regime 2) as we move from the lowest- to highest-inflation regime. These
frequencies are about twice as high as those reported in Nakamura and Steinsson (2008) for
the United States. In addition, this strong correlation between frequency of price change
and inflation runs counter to much of the empirical literature (e.g., Klenow and Kryvtsov
(2008)). Both of these differences are accounted for by the fact that inflation is much higher
in Ecuador than in the United States, even during the most stable period of Dollarization. A
more appropriate comparison of inflation rates is Gagnon (2009), who studies the frequency
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of price changes in Mexico from 1994 to 2002 and shows that inflation is strongly positively
correlated with price change frequency when inflation is over 10 percent (per annum). Even
during the stable Dollarization regime, Ecuadorian annual inflation is about 14 percent
annually. Table 2.1 also shows that higher inflation periods are associated with larger price
changes as pointed out by Ahlin and Shintani (2007).
As other authors have pointed out, the frequency of price adjustment differs much more
substantially across items in the consumption basket than across inflation regimes. This
heterogeneity of frequencies across goods is a universal feature of micro-price data. An
important question to ask is whether the cross-sectional variance in the frequency of price
changes reflects an economic structure that macroeconomists should be building into their
models or just uninteresting noise. We suspect that economic structure underlies these
patterns.
Answering a simple question has direct bearing on this issue: Does the frequency
of price adjustment maintain its cross-sectional distribution as macroeconomic conditions
move from one regime to another? Figure 2.2 plots the frequency of price adjustment by
goods in our microsample as individual data points. The x-coordinates of this figure are the
frequencies of price adjustment in Regime 1, the sample with the inflation rate closest to the
historical mean. The y-coordinates for the red and green dots are the frequencies of price
adjustment in Regime 2 (the Crisis regime) and Regime 3 (the Dollarization regime), re-
spectively. The higher (lower) average price adjustment frequencies in Regime 2 (Regime
3) are evident with the red (green) scatter lying systematically above (below) the 45-degree
line. Here we see a striking pattern in the data: items with above (or below) average fre-
quencies of price adjustment in one regime are also items with above (or below) average
frequencies of price adjustment in the next regime. What changes across regimes is the av-
erage frequency of price change, but this is trivial relative to the dispersion in frequencies
of price change across goods. This pattern is inconsistent with menu cost models in which
the heterogeneity in price adjustments comes from firms drawing randomly from a com-
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mon distribution of menu costs (e.g., Dotsey et al. (1999) and the open-economy versions
of Landry (2009) and Landry (2010)) or from a common distribution of productivity shocks
(e.g., Golosov and Lucas (2007)). In these cases, we would expect a cloud of points tightly
clustered around the mean frequency in each regime with little or no pattern in relation to
the 45-degree line.
Figure 2.2: Monthly Frequency of Price Adjustment in the Data
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Note: Comparison of price adjustment frequencies across regimes. Each dot represents one good’s frequency
of price adjustment across two regimes. The x-coordinates represent the price adjustment frequencies in
Regime 1, while the y-coordinates represent the price adjustment frequencies in the Regime 2 (the Crisis
regime) and Regime 3 (the Dollarization regime).
Evidence of a structural relationship comes from the fact that the cross-sectional distri-
bution of price adjustment frequencies is preserved across regimes. That is, the frequencies
of price changes across goods is strongly positively correlated across regimes (i.e., the
green and red scatter diagrams show strong positive correlation with each other). What this
suggests is that there is some factor specific to an individual good that induces more- or
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less-frequent price adjustments whereas the inflation regime shifts the mean frequency of
price change across goods. Next, we turn to our explanation for this stable cross-sectional
distribution of price adjustment frequencies.
2.3 The Model
In this section, we develop a menu cost model of pricing in which retail firms inter-
mediate trade between producers and consumers. The model we develop is a multi-sector
generalization of the model presented by Golosov and Lucas (2007) akin to Nakamura
and Steinsson (2010)’s multisector model, but where the intermediate inputs are tradable
inputs. In contrast to Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), however, we let heterogeneity in
the firms’ cost structure dictate the frequency of price adjustment—instead of relying on
heterogeneous menu costs.
Like traditional menu cost models, firms must pay a common fixed menu cost in order
to adjust their price. However, unlike these models, each firm’s cost function may have
a different weight on local and imported factors of production and, therefore leave the
firm differentially exposed to the two cost shocks. Naturally, then, firms with a higher
cost share of more volatile input price will adjust their prices more frequently. In most
macroeconomic settings, the more volatile input prices in retail goods is the traded input
component. Food and energy provide good examples due to their ties to volatile commodity
prices via traded inputs. We turn now to the structural details of the model.
2.3.1 A Menu Cost Model of Price Adjustment
We develop a partial equilibrium model in which a continuum of firms indexed by i be-
longs to a sector that combines labor (i.e., retail services) and a wholesale good purchased
in global markets to produce a differentiated final consumption good. The production func-
tion for firm i at time t is
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yit = l
αi
it m
1−αi
it , (2.1)
where yit is the final good the consumer purchases, lit denotes retail services involved in
making the good available to the final consumer and mit is the intermediate-imported good.
Consumers have CES preferences over goods and thus the demand for the good i at
time t is
yit = y
(
Pit
Pt
)−θ
, (2.2)
where Pit is the nominal price of good i and the price index, Pt , is consistent with the CES
preference function; it will be proxied with the CPI price index in the data. Real aggregate
demand (and income) is y, and θ is the elasticity of demand.
Firm i maximizes the value of its expected discounted profits
Et
∞
∑
s=t
βt,spiis, (2.3)
where βt,s is the discount factor between period t and future period s. Real profits in period
t are given by
piit =
Pit
Pt
yit−WtPt lit−
Pmit
Pt
mit−χIit , (2.4)
where Wt is the nominal wage, Pmit is the nominal price of the intermediate imported good,
Iit is an indicator variable equal to one if the firm changes its price in period t and zero
otherwise, and χ is the common menu cost of price adjustment in units of aggregate con-
sumption.
The price adjustment decision of a firm in our model has two dimensions: First, the
price adjustment decision is a function of three relative prices: the firm’s price relative
to the aggregate price level, the real wage and the real price of the intermediate-imported
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good. Second, the size of the inaction region and the magnitude of the price jumps are
different for each component of marginal cost, and depend on the cost share of labor and
traded inputs into production. To see this more clearly, consider a log-linearized version of
the nominal cost function implied by the model,
cit = αiwt +(1−αi)pmit . (2.5)
The two state variables are the wage rate in Ecuador, wt , and the import price, pmit . In our
setting, the variance of the marginal cost function depends on the variance of wages, the
variance of import prices, and their covariance. It also depends on the cost share of the two
inputs, αi. In Golosov and Lucas (2007), the frequency of price changes is increasing in the
variance of idioynscratic firm-level productivity shocks because this translates directly into
higher variance in marginal cost. In our setting, however, the frequency of price adjustment
depends on the cost share of the two inputs and on the variance of the wage relative to the
import price. The variance of cost, assuming a zero covariance between the traded input
and the wage, is
σ2c,i = α
2
i σ
2
w+(1−αi)2σ2im. (2.6)
Under the plausible restriction that the variance of traded input prices exceed that of wages,
retail items with more traded content should reprice more frequently. However, the good
or service with the lowest repricing frequency is not generally a pure labor service since a
mix of inputs provides diversification against idiosyncratic factor price risk. Put differently,
the U-shaped relationship between the distribution share and the total cost variance will
also generally produce a U-shaped frequency of price change when plotted against the
distribution share.
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2.3.2 Model’s Solution and Calibration
Due to the lack of monthly wage and import price data available for Ecuador, we make
two simplifying assumptions. First, we assume that the price of haircuts can be used as
a proxy for the wage.3 After setting the nominal wage, Wt , equal to the price of haircuts,
we rely on the model, our observed retail price, Pit , and measures of the distribution cost
share from the U.S. Personal Consumption Expenditure Bridge Table to back out the import
price, Pmit . Assuming constant markups and using our log-linear nominal cost function,
pit = αiwt +(1−αi)pmit , (2.7)
rearranging the equation gives the (log) price of the traded intermediate good i
pmit =
pit−αiwt
(1−αi) . (2.8)
The variables pt , wt , and pmit , form the basis of our three-variable stochastic state space:
pt = µ+ pt−1+ εp,t , (2.9)
wt− pt = ρw(wt− pt)+ εw,t , (2.10)
pmit − pt = ρim(pmit−1− pt−1)+ εim,t . (2.11)
In these equation, the error terms are assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero
and variances σ2ε , σ2εw , and σ
2
εim . Table 2.2 gives the results of this estimation exercise.
In our benchmark calibration, we assume that all firms face the same import-price
shocks (using the median volatility across regimes and goods) as this allows us to iso-
late the role of heterogeneous distribution margins in accounting for the cross-sectional
3We ran an AR(1) on all non-traded goods prices for which α > 0.85 (e.g., haircuts, automobile tune-up,
dry cleaning service, taxi, rent of a house). Haircut prices happens to be the AR(1) process with the median
volatility among retail items with high distribution shares. Using the least volatile AR(1) process across
regimes as a proxy for the wage does not change the qualitative results.
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heterogeneity in price-change frequencies.4 Later in the text, we relax this assumption and
look at the model’s predictions of our model when import-price shocks are heterogeneous
across regimes and goods.
Table 2.2: Stochastic Properties of Shocks
Full sample Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3
Moderate regime Crisis regime Dolarization regime
1997:01-2003:04 1997:01-1998:07 1998:08-2000:12 2001:01-2003:04
Inflation
µ 0.028 0.022 0.047 0.011
σεp 0.026 0.008 0.031 0.010
Real wage
(real price of haircuts)
ρw 0.986 0.647 0.887 0.977
σεw 0.021 0.015 0.026 0.015
Real import price
(median across αi)
ρm 0.941 0.950 0.923 0.899
σεim 0.185 0.108 0.164 0.102
Anticipating this, Figure 2.3 is a histogram showing the variance of the import price
series for each of the regimes and the full sample. As expected, the import price shocks
are more widely distributed in Regime 2 and in the full sample. The heterogeneity in the
veracity of import price shocks across retail items adds an additional source of heterogene-
ity in price change frequency and (as we shall see) further advances the model’s ability to
account for the diversity of pricing behavior exhibited in the Ecuadorian micro-data.
Firm i’s optimization problem may be written recursively in the form of the Bellman
equation
4The volatility of our AR(1) processes is defined as σ2εim/(1−ρ2im).
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Figure 2.3: Distribution of Import Price Volatility
Note: Distribution of import prices standard deviation across regimes bins width of 0.1.
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piit +βEtV
(
Pit
Pt+1
,
Wt+1
Pt+1
,
Pmt+1
Pt+1
)]
, (2.12)
where V (·) is firm i’s value function. We solve the model numerically for each firm i’s
(defined by a non-traded share, αi) by iterating the Bellman operator that yields the value
(2.12), and policy function on a discrete grid.
To match Ecuador’s historical data, we allow for the stochastic process of the relative
prices, the real wage, and the real import price to vary across regimes according to Table
2.2. The non-traded shares αi and the menu cost χ do not change over time. We choose the
menu cost so as to match the average frequency of price adjustments across firms in the full
sample (i.e., 57.7 percent). This approach results in a menu cost parameter, χ , of 0.0004,
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which implies that the cost of price adjustment equals about 0.60 percent of the average
firm’s revenues in the full sample. Appendix B provides a full explanation of the solution
method.
2.4 Results
Having estimated the stochastic processes for the two components of the firm’s cost
function, we are in a position to compare our benchmark model’s predictions for the fre-
quencies of price change across sectors and regimes with the micro-data. To isolate the
impact of heterogeneous distribution margins, we first present results where the variance of
import price shocks are the same for all firms. Then, we look into the prediction of a more
realistic model in which each firm faces import price shocks with a different veracity.
2.4.1 Benchmark model
Before turning to the simulation results, it is instructive to compare the policy functions
of three representative firms with different distribution shares to gain some intuition for the
relationship between menu costs and price adjustment. Figure 2.4 shows the firms’ policy
functions using the full sample calibration. In this figure, we hold constant the aggregate
price level, the import price, and the wage.5 This is a common figure within the menu
cost literature, which shows the price adjustment cutoffs as the firm’s real price fluctuates
around its optimal price. In Figure 2.4, each firms has a different policy function because
each firm has a different cost structure.
The sensitivity of the cost structure to cost shocks also leads firms to have slightly dif-
ferent bands of inaction (or price adjustment cutoffs) relative to their optimal price. Con-
sistent with our theory, we observe that firms that rely more heavily on one cost (i.e. wage
5Note that these policy functions have normalized around the firms’ optimal price, as the cost structure
shifts firms’ marginal cost and optimal price.
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or import prices) have wider inaction bands.6 For example, a firm that heavily rely on im-
ports (e.g., α = 0.167) requires a larger deviation in its relative price to induce an optimal
price change than does a firm that relies mostly on labor (e.g., α = 0.931). In practice,
the volatility of inputs prices is so much larger than wages that the direct effect of higher
cost volatility dominates the indirect effect of the option value of waiting (widening of
the bands of inaction) and prices change more frequently for retail items with more traded
factor content.
Figure 2.4: Costs Variance and Policy Functions
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Note: The top panel shows the firms’ costs variance, by distribution share. The bottom panel shows the
policy function of three firms with different distribution share, normalized around their optimal price in the
full sample calibration, holding constant the aggregate price level, the import price, and the wage. This figure
shows that firms that experience higher costs variance have larger inaction bands.
In our first exercise, we test the ability of our model to match the median frequency
of prices changes across all three regimes. Figure 2.5 presents the median frequencies of
price adjustments by regime for each city in the Ecuadorian micro-panel as well as the
predictions of the baseline calibration of the model. The large circles are the predictions
6As pointed out by the referees, Barro (1972), and more recently Vavra (2014), increase in the volatility
of input prices have two effects: First, there is a direct effect where greater volatility pushes more firms to
adjust for a given region of inaction. Second, greater volatility also increases the option value of waiting,
which widens the size of the inaction region and decreases the frequency of price adjustment. The first effect
typically dominates with an increase in volatility, leading more frequent price adjustments despite wider
inaction bands.
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from the model while the small dots are the median frequency of price adjustment across
cities. For example, the cluster of green dots represents the median frequencies of price
adjustments across goods, city-by-city, for the Dollarization regime (Regime 3). Figure
2.5 confirms that our benchmark calibration model captures well the frequency of price
adjustment across regimes.
Figure 2.5: Average Frequency of Price Adjustment by Regime, Data versus Model
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Note: Comparison of the frequency of price adjustment by regime, in the data and in the model.
Our next exercise is to see how the model fares in accounting for the heterogeneity of
price adjustment frequencies across goods. Panel A of Figure 2.7 displays the frequency
of price adjustment for each distribution share in the benchmark model. In this panel, each
dot represents a distribution share across the regimes in the same fashion as the data were
presented in Figure 2.2: Regime 1’s simulations are on the x-axis and Regime 2’s and 3’s
are the y-coordinates. It should be kept in mind that we have fewer distribution shares than
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goods, which limits to some extent the cross-sectional variance that results. That being
said, the variation is smaller than what we saw in Figure 2.2 earlier. We suspect that this is
partly due to our adherence to a common variance of import-price shocks across goods. In
the next subsection, we relax this assumption and extend the model to include heterogeneity
in import prices.
Finally, Figure 2.6 displays the relationship between the distribution share (on the x-
axis) and the frequency of price adjustment (on the y-axis) in the model and in the data. The
blue dots show the median frequency of price adjustment for each distribution share in the
data. These dots show that firms that rely more heavily of both inputs (i.e., a distribution
share close to 0.5) usually reprice less frequently than firms that rely more heavily on
one input. In the model, this corresponds to the U-shape relationship discussed above
and readily apparent by the black dots. Our model not only accounts for the fact that
goods maintain a certain frequency of price adjustment pattern across regimes, but it also
distinguishes which goods are more likely to reprice based on their cost structure.
Together, these results indicate that our menu cost model can account for many of the
stylized facts we found in Section 2 and Section 3 regarding the price adjustment process
of firms that are heterogeneous in their cost structure. In addition to matching the positive
correlation between frequencies of price changes and aggregate inflation, our structural
model provides a novel explanation for the different frequencies of price changes observed
across the distribution of goods in the CPI.
2.4.1.1 Model with idiosyncratic import prices
In the baseline calibration, we use the stochastic property of the import price with the
median volatility as a proxy for import prices. In this section, we extend the model to take
into account differences in the volatility of import prices across retail goods. That is, we
will use the stochastic property of the import price (as found in equation (2.11)) for each
αi firm. We use the median volatility import-price series for each sector that has more than
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Figure 2.6: Frequencies of price adjustment by regime and distribution share
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Note: The blue dots represent the median frequency of price adjustment across distribution shares in the
data. The black dots represent the monthly frequency of price adjustment across firms in the model. The
x-coordinate is the distribution share of the firms and the y-coordinate is the monthly frequency of price
adjustment.
one retail good.7
Figure 2.7, Panel B, displays the frequency of price adjustment for each distribution
share in our model with idiosyncratic import prices. As for Panel A, each dot represents
a distribution share across the regimes in the same fashion as the data were presented in
Figure 2.2: Regime 1’s simulations are on the x-axis and Regime 2’s and 3’s are the y-
coordinates. As opposed to Panel A, however, the variation in the frequency of price ad-
justment is much closer to that in Figure 2.2. In particular, the scatter plot for Regime 2 is
7In addition, Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) and Berger and Vavra (2017) show that variation in markup
elasticity across firms can generate significant variation in the frequency of price adjustment. As an alternative
to our benchmark model, Appendix C looks into the pricing dynamics of firms facing variable markups.
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concentrated above the 45 degree line, while that of Regime 3 are mostly below the scatter
of Regime 2.
In particular, this panel speaks to Boivin et al. (2009) evidence that disaggregated prices
appear sticky in response to macroeconomic and monetary disturbances but flexible in re-
sponse to sector-specific shocks: Panel B shows that sector-specific shocks (i.e., idiosyn-
cratic import prices) increase the frequency of price adjustment compared to the benchmark
model’s where firms face common shocks (Panel A). In other words, the model with id-
iosyncratic import prices generates responses to sector-level and aggregate shocks that are
closer to what we observe in the data.
2.5 Conclusion
In making decisions about changes in the federal funds rate, it is essential that mon-
etary policymakers distinguish generalized inflationary impulses from changes in relative
prices that may affect some, but not all, market prices. The structure of our model helps
to elucidate these differences. Changes in the prices of imported goods are often large and
induce frequent changes in the retail prices of these goods. Essentially, this is why food and
energy are typically excluded in measures of core inflation. The typical explanation for the
volatility of these prices is that the markets for them are subject to particularly large sector-
specific shocks. Our approach generalizes this conventional wisdom by recognizing that
final goods have distinct production functions in the sense of requiring different intensities
of retail labor in making them available to final consumers. This allows us to parse the in-
flationary impulse of, say, an indexed wage (typically the cost-push dimension of monetary
policy) from shocks that are idiosyncratic to the good or sector (such as imported goods).
Ecuador provides an ideal setting to explore this mechanism by virtue of high-frequency
micro-price data by good and city spanning a varied inflationary experience.
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Figure 2.7: Monthly Frequency of Price Adjustment in the Model
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A. Benchmark model
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B. Model with idiosyncratic import prices
Note: Comparison of price adjustment frequencies across regimes in the model. Each dot represents one
firm’s frequency of price adjustment across two regimes. The x-coordinates represent the price adjustment
frequencies in Regime 1, while the y-coordinates represent the price adjustment frequencies in the Regime 2
(the Crisis regime) and Regime 3 (the Dollarization regime).
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Our hope is that our work will motivate similar studies in other countries to validate the
menu cost model developed here using a broader cross-section of nations and inflationary
environments closer to that of the United States.
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Appendix A
Distribution Shares
The distribution share for each good and service available in the Ecuadorian monthly
database of retail prices is listed in the table below.
Table A.1 List of Goods and Services
Distribution Frequency of Price Adjustment
Item Share Full Sample Reg. 1 Reg. 2 Reg. 3
Automobile or pick-up truck 0.167 0.663 0.963 0.875 0.253
Gasoline 0.189 0.341 0.546 0.414 0.083
Newspaper 0.318 0.184 0.120 0.319 0.086
Magazine 0.318 0.192 0.194 0.229 0.136
Toilet Paper 0.341 0.466 0.338 0.643 0.374
Milk, fresh 0.361 0.429 0.468 0.506 0.318
Cheese 0.361 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Eggs 0.361 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Oil, vegetable 0.361 0.658 0.681 0.762 0.528
Margarine 0.361 0.636 0.676 0.735 0.497
Fruit cocktail, can 0.361 0.656 0.616 0.750 0.593
Raisins 0.361 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Peas, dry 0.361 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.997
Beans, dry 0.361 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.997
Lentils 0.361 0.999 1.000 1.000 0.997
Peanuts 0.361 0.999 1.000 0.997 1.000
Sugar 0.361 0.994 0.995 0.997 0.991
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Chocolate, candy 0.361 0.612 0.500 0.637 0.670
Candy 0.361 0.630 0.546 0.741 0.583
Gelatine 0.361 0.563 0.551 0.646 0.472
Marmalade 0.361 0.670 0.532 0.810 0.602
Honey 0.361 0.482 0.338 0.545 0.528
Panela 0.361 0.996 0.991 1.000 0.994
Salt 0.361 0.622 0.653 0.670 0.553
Ketchup 0.361 0.606 0.630 0.732 0.460
Broad beans, flour 0.361 0.993 1.000 1.000 0.982
Soup, dry 0.361 0.642 0.546 0.789 0.546
Coffee, ground 0.361 0.687 1.000 0.714 0.444
Coffee, instant 0.361 0.590 0.491 0.720 0.519
Cocoa 0.361 0.689 0.611 0.765 0.661
Mineral water 0.361 0.410 0.333 0.500 0.358
Soft drink, store 0.361 0.364 0.375 0.506 0.213
Orange juice 0.361 0.508 0.454 0.637 0.420
Soft drink in powder 0.361 0.381 0.389 0.449 0.303
Beer, at store 0.361 0.340 0.306 0.506 0.188
Rum 0.361 0.590 0.482 0.708 0.565
Wine 0.361 0.582 0.380 0.744 0.559
Milk of magnesia 0.361 0.453 0.509 0.637 0.232
Chicken, rotisserie 0.361 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Glass 0.366 0.490 0.357 0.688 0.380
Medicines in general 0.366 0.941 0.977 0.997 0.855
Aspirin (medicine) 0.366 0.344 0.357 0.545 0.130
Linconcin (medicine) 0.366 0.472 0.458 0.696 0.219
Flagil (medicine) 0.366 0.364 0.347 0.554 0.188
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Garamicina (medicine) 0.366 0.417 0.500 0.533 0.235
Neurobion (medicine) 0.366 0.414 0.245 0.753 0.179
Voltaren (medicine) 0.366 0.429 0.588 0.524 0.232
Megacilina (medicine) 0.366 0.410 0.403 0.649 0.170
Apronax (medicine) 0.366 0.428 0.463 0.643 0.179
Redoxon (medicine) 0.366 0.400 0.273 0.720 0.127
Hepabionta (medicine) 0.366 0.330 0.301 0.569 0.093
Baycuten, cream (medicine) 0.366 0.442 0.431 0.571 0.293
Comtrex (medicine) 0.366 0.422 0.426 0.634 0.201
Mucosolvan (medicine) 0.366 0.478 0.375 0.676 0.349
Cataflam (medicine) 0.366 0.460 0.528 0.619 0.262
Fungirex (medicine) 0.366 0.417 0.310 0.646 0.250
Imodium (medicine) 0.366 0.298 0.282 0.521 0.077
Acrosin-B (medicine) 0.366 0.417 0.319 0.622 0.287
Glasses 0.366 0.416 0.407 0.560 0.278
Cigarrettes 0.367 0.253 0.181 0.405 0.161
Stove, gas 0.393 0.753 0.755 0.875 0.636
Blender 0.393 0.707 0.616 0.878 0.593
Refrigerator 0.393 0.704 0.611 0.863 0.614
Pot, cooking 0.393 0.534 0.505 0.699 0.404
Cup with dish 0.393 0.472 0.417 0.661 0.318
Bleach, for laundry 0.405 0.572 0.458 0.711 0.509
Detergent 0.405 0.550 0.583 0.646 0.429
Soap for dishwashing 0.405 0.620 0.574 0.708 0.556
Soap for laundry 0.405 0.523 0.579 0.604 0.395
Cologne 0.405 0.466 0.343 0.580 0.438
Cream, moisturizer 0.405 0.598 0.500 0.679 0.580
32
Deodorant 0.405 0.552 0.435 0.616 0.565
Soap, deodorant 0.405 0.567 0.468 0.637 0.568
Toothpaste 0.405 0.620 0.602 0.702 0.549
Shampoo 0.405 0.537 0.361 0.625 0.574
Talc powder 0.405 0.610 0.546 0.670 0.593
Sanitary pads 0.405 0.612 0.519 0.711 0.583
TV set, color 0.411 0.721 0.611 0.848 0.673
Rent of VHS movie 0.411 0.299 0.232 0.390 0.256
Sewing machine 0.421 0.632 0.588 0.777 0.519
Iron, electric 0.421 0.640 0.537 0.857 0.494
Sound system, stereo 0.421 0.723 0.630 0.887 0.636
VCR 0.421 0.714 0.569 0.839 0.698
Shoe polish 0.445 0.571 0.389 0.696 0.583
Disinfectant, domestic 0.445 0.548 0.449 0.685 0.491
Cupboard, wooden 0.487 0.614 0.556 0.765 0.515
Bed, wooden 0.487 0.579 0.472 0.744 0.491
Chest of drawers, wooden 0.487 0.546 0.426 0.682 0.485
Matches 0.487 0.307 0.278 0.467 0.145
Book, primary school (typical) 0.487 0.141 0.144 0.164 0.127
Notebook for primary school 0.487 0.179 0.157 0.226 0.157
Notebook for secundary school 0.487 0.192 0.181 0.235 0.170
Paper, bond 0.487 0.182 0.162 0.232 0.157
Algebra book 0.487 0.190 0.218 0.202 0.173
Dictionary for school 0.487 0.130 0.148 0.140 0.117
Razor, standard manual 0.491 0.573 0.482 0.702 0.497
Cassimere, fabric 0.519 0.557 0.495 0.744 0.414
Chalis, fabric 0.519 0.566 0.389 0.765 0.488
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Silk, fabric 0.519 0.433 0.315 0.607 0.340
Dress for woman, making 0.519 0.434 0.273 0.530 0.454
Pants for man, making 0.519 0.483 0.380 0.655 0.386
Suit for man, making 0.519 0.582 0.486 0.717 0.525
Socks, mens 0.519 0.507 0.431 0.711 0.367
Underwear, mens 0.519 0.561 0.477 0.735 0.454
Shirt, mens 0.519 0.550 0.560 0.711 0.380
T-shirt, mens 0.519 0.546 0.472 0.717 0.417
Pants, mens 0.519 0.623 0.574 0.768 0.528
Shorts, for sports, mens 0.519 0.512 0.380 0.679 0.441
Suit for men 0.519 0.541 0.468 0.705 0.426
T-shirt, childrens 0.519 0.590 0.500 0.708 0.531
Pants, boys 0.519 0.537 0.394 0.732 0.429
Blouse, womens, typical 0.519 0.512 0.370 0.688 0.423
Underwear, womens 0.519 0.513 0.417 0.679 0.411
T-shirt, womens 0.519 0.513 0.449 0.685 0.383
Skirt, womens 0.519 0.461 0.310 0.577 0.441
Pantyhose, nylon 0.519 0.407 0.431 0.488 0.309
Pants, womens 0.519 0.618 0.560 0.777 0.497
Dress, womens 0.519 0.501 0.380 0.667 0.420
Pants, girls 0.519 0.518 0.403 0.699 0.404
Underwear, girls 0.519 0.580 0.528 0.741 0.463
Dress, girls 0.519 0.547 0.352 0.726 0.503
Shirt, babies 0.519 0.472 0.380 0.601 0.414
Suit for baby 0.519 0.492 0.361 0.691 0.380
Shoes, leather, mens 0.519 0.558 0.463 0.759 0.414
Shoes, sneakers, mens 0.519 0.441 0.370 0.637 0.287
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Shoes, boys 0.519 0.549 0.468 0.717 0.441
Shoes, leather, womens 0.519 0.568 0.472 0.753 0.451
Shoes, sneakers, womens 0.519 0.561 0.482 0.735 0.448
Shoes, girls 0.519 0.586 0.454 0.750 0.506
Shoe polishing 0.519 0.184 0.157 0.238 0.151
Dining set 0.519 0.588 0.519 0.756 0.469
Living room set 0.519 0.586 0.528 0.717 0.506
Blanket, thick, very warm 0.519 0.480 0.463 0.682 0.296
Blanket, thick, warm 0.519 0.443 0.333 0.634 0.327
Mattress 0.519 0.529 0.403 0.711 0.432
Blanket, thin 0.519 0.579 0.514 0.744 0.466
Towel 0.519 0.557 0.463 0.702 0.485
Broom 0.519 0.529 0.407 0.679 0.469
Uniform for school 0.519 0.158 0.181 0.173 0.139
School supplies in general 0.519 0.267 0.269 0.286 0.265
Compass, drawing, primary school 0.519 0.184 0.171 0.226 0.164
Ruler, primary school 0.519 0.188 0.185 0.214 0.176
Pen for primary school 0.519 0.163 0.153 0.211 0.133
Folder 0.519 0.159 0.153 0.196 0.136
Geometry set for school 0.519 0.179 0.120 0.208 0.201
Ruler, secondary school 0.519 0.184 0.194 0.214 0.161
Pen for secundary school 0.519 0.160 0.157 0.211 0.120
Diapers, disposable for children 0.519 0.542 0.435 0.640 0.522
Vegetable fat 0.523 0.591 0.597 0.685 0.469
Avocado 0.523 0.981 0.935 0.997 0.997
Bananas 0.523 0.993 0.991 0.997 0.991
Lemons 0.523 0.946 1.000 1.000 0.849
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Apples 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Raspberries 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Oranges 0.523 0.903 0.986 1.000 0.778
Naranjilla 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Papaya 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Pineapple 0.523 0.998 0.991 1.000 1.000
Plantain 0.523 0.999 1.000 0.997 1.000
Watermelon 0.523 0.987 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tomatillo 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Grapes 0.523 0.999 0.995 1.000 1.000
Peas, fresh 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Onion, white 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Onion, red 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Cabbage 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Cauliflower 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Corn, fresh 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Broad beans, fresh 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Beans, fresh 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Lettuce 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Bell pepper 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Tomatoes 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Potatoes 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Yucca 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Carrots 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Garlic 0.523 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Bicycle, typical 0.531 0.473 0.565 0.801 0.074
Typewriter 0.531 0.474 0.486 0.753 0.179
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Light bulb, typical 0.574 0.569 0.569 0.759 0.386
Tire, with tube if needed 0.589 0.547 0.532 0.640 0.463
Soccer ball 0.589 0.420 0.486 0.714 0.071
Inter-province trip 0.751 0.157 0.157 0.205 0.071
Transportation, public in bus 0.751 0.137 0.102 0.220 0.046
Entertainment, dancing 0.751 0.342 0.213 0.455 0.327
Lunch, typical 0.751 0.448 0.380 0.625 0.315
Soft drink, at bar 0.751 0.347 0.282 0.470 0.272
Beer, at bar 0.751 0.371 0.329 0.524 0.228
Lodging, typical 0.751 0.400 0.315 0.545 0.318
Water (utility) 0.760 0.209 0.125 0.232 0.244
Electricity 0.760 0.599 0.153 0.777 0.719
Gas, natural, domestic 0.760 0.194 0.264 0.223 0.093
Shoe repair 0.848 0.382 0.273 0.545 0.290
Laundry service 0.848 0.290 0.255 0.366 0.225
Dry cleaning 0.848 0.392 0.292 0.557 0.303
Doctors visit 0.848 0.349 0.278 0.399 0.346
Lab test, typical medical 0.848 0.359 0.301 0.482 0.281
Automobile tune-up 0.848 0.567 0.625 0.714 0.392
Soccer game 0.848 0.170 0.107 0.208 0.179
Tuition, kindergarden 0.848 0.134 0.144 0.164 0.108
Tuition, primary school 0.848 0.149 0.162 0.179 0.120
Registration, secondary school 0.848 0.124 0.153 0.140 0.099
Tuition, secondary school 0.848 0.139 0.157 0.170 0.105
Registration, university 0.848 0.119 0.097 0.149 0.111
Haircut 0.848 0.309 0.245 0.429 0.225
Taxi, urban 0.856 0.132 0.120 0.208 0.040
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Rent of house, typical 0.931 0.924 0.824 0.967 0.948
Rent of apartment, typical 0.931 0.886 0.903 0.890 0.874
Rent of room, efficiency 0.931 0.924 0.958 0.902 0.929
Postage for letter, typical 1.000 0.096 0.014 0.137 0.114
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Appendix B
Equations, and Solution Method
B.0.1 Profit function
Firm i maximizes the value of its expected discounted profits,
Et
∞
∑
s=t
βt,spii,s, (B.1)
where real profit is,
piit =
Pit
Pt
yit−WtPt lit−
Pmit
Pt
mit−χIit . (B.2)
With a Cobb-Douglas production function, the cost index is
Pcit =
(
Wt
αi
)αi( Pmit
1−αi
)1−αi
. (B.3)
Hence, we compute real profit as
piit =
(
Pit
Pt
− P
c
it
Pt
)
yit−χIit . (B.4)
B.0.2 Solution Method
Here are the steps we use to solve and simulate the model.
1. Define the grids and transition probability matrix for PitPt ,
Wt
Pt
, and P
m
it
Pt
, using the
Rouwenhorst method (as in Kopecky and Suen (2010)). We use a grid with incre-
ments of one percent for the firms real price, and with increments of two percent for
the real wage and the real import price.
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2. Create the profits grid in the space PitPt ,
Wt
Pt
, and P
m
it
Pt
.
3. Iterate the Bellman equation (2.12) to convergence.
4. Compute the price adjustment policy function.
5. Repeat step 1. to 4. for each αi firm.
6. Simulate the model for each αi firm over an horizon of 10,000 periods (months).
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Appendix C
Model with variable markups
Gopinath and Itskhoki (2010) and Berger and Vavra (2017) show that variation in
markup elasticity across firms can generate significant variation in the frequency of price
adjustment. In these studies, however, variation in the markup elasticity were meant to
generate time-variation in price adjustment dispersion—as oppose to steady-state outcomes
across regimes.
As in Gopinath et al. (2010a), we allow for variable markups through the non-constant
demand elasticity schedule proposed by Klenow and Willis (2016). This specification is
a useful abstraction for modeling variable markups arising from strategic interactions be-
tween monopolistic competitors because the super-elasticity of demand provide a strong
incentive for a firm to keep its price close to the aggregate price level. Specifically, con-
sumers’ preferences are represented by an aggregator over the consumption of a continuum
of products i ∈ [0,1] such that the demand for the ith product take the form
yit =
(
1− γ ln
(
Pit
Pt
))θ/γ
yi,t , (C.1)
where θ > 0 governs the elasticity of demand and ε > 1 the super-elasticity of demand. In
this exercise, we keep the values from the benchmark model calibration and set ε to 3 as in
Gopinath et al. (2010a).
Figure C.1 displays the frequency of price adjustments for each distribution share in
the model with variable markups. In this figure, each dot represents a distribution share
across the regimes in the same fashion as the data were presented in Figure 2.2: Regime
1’s simulations are on the x-axis and Regime 2’s and 3’s are the y-coordinates. The figure
shows that variation in markup elasticity across firms changes the frequency of price adjust-
ment across firms. The central message of this exercise, however, is that the cross-sectional
41
distribution of price adjustment frequencies is preserved across regimes—as in Figure 2.2.
Figure C.1: Monthly Frequency of Price Adjustment in the Model with Variable Markups
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Regime 1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Regime 2
Regime 3
Note: Comparison of price adjustment frequencies across regimes in the model with variable markups. Each
dot represents one firm’s frequency of price adjustment across two regimes. The x-coordinates represent the
price adjustment frequencies in Regime 1, while the y-coordinates represent the price adjustment frequencies
in the Regime 2 (the Crisis regime) and Regime 3 (the Dollarization regime).
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Chapter 3
The Law of One Price in Ecuador
3.1 Introduction
While the law of one price (LOP) and the related theory of purchasing power parity
(PPP) are taught in almost every undergraduate international finance class, its regular oc-
currence has always been perceived as more of a theoretical desire than an empirical reality.
The former theory is straightforward. If goods in location A were to cost more than goods
in location B, then a profit-seeking agent could simply buy the goods in location B and
transport them to location A, selling them at the higher price. Assuming low transportation
costs, the process could be repeated indefinitely making a nice profit for the arbitrageur
who would continue to have the incentive to transport goods as long as the price discrep-
ancy remained. This would increase demand in location B and supply in location A until
their prices eventually converged, eliminating the incentive for arbitrage and settling at an
equilibrium where the price of similar goods were the same across locations. PPP is the
related theory that if all retail prices were to converge to the same level for all goods, then
national price aggregates of those goods should converge as well. It is commonly divided
into two variants: absolute PPP and the less restrictive relative PPP. Absolute PPP states
that after accounting for exchange rate differences, the national price level should converge
to the same level. Relative PPP states that while the price levels may not converge to the
same point, the growth rates of two countries equal each other after accounting for the
growth rate of the exchange rate.
However, as many authors including Rogoff (1996) have pointed out, the empirical ev-
idence does not match well with the theory. What has become known in the literature as
the “PPP Paradox” is one of the most researched areas of international finance over the last
three decades. Despite the logic of the theory, the results of studies relating to the PPP
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paradox have been clear and consistent in their opposition to PPP. Studies have demon-
strated this in a number of ways, but the most relevant to this study is to calculate the
convergence properties of the real exchange rate (RER) using unit root tests. The “consen-
sus view” is that a shock to the RER may in fact never die out or at the very least, take
a while to do so. Most papers in the field have estimated a half-life to these shocks in
the range of approximately three to five years on the lower end. Frankel and Rose (1996)
estimate the half-life to be about 4 years. Murray and Papell (2002) estimate half-lives at
about 4.6 years. These large and long-lasting deviations of the real exchange rate have been
documented extensively. Even when focusing purely on intranational price convergence,
Cecchetti et al. (2002) looks at a panel of 19 US cities over a 77 year period and estimates
half-life of RER deviations to be approximately 9 years.
A number of explanations were put forward but again quickly rejected by the data. One
argument, was that both LOP and PPP rely on low transaction costs associated with the
goods’ prices. If a good were non-traded, then an arbitrage process could not occur and the
prices would not converge. However, Engel (1999) has demonstrated that even with this
caveat, the theory may be lacking. In a seminal paper, he creates price indices of traded and
non-traded goods. He finds that traded goods are, contrary to the theory, more likely to be
responsible for movements in the real exchange rate and deviations from purchasing power
parity. Non-traded goods’ prices are negligible in the movement of the real exchange rate.
Cecchetti et al. (2002) finds support to an extent but argues that it depends on econometric
methods used. Using an Im, Pesaran, and Shin unit root test, they find faster convergence
for traded goods but a Levin and Lin unit root test shows results that mirror those of Engel.
Despite these initial drawbacks through, much of the recent literature has seemed to
come from what Taylor (2001) dubs the “whittling down half-life team,” a phenomenon
described by Taylor that suggests the LOP may be a more reasonable approach than be-
lieved two decades ago. The lack of corroboration of PPP lies not in the theory but in the
data. Specifically, the past two decades has seen the introduction of micro-data or prices
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at much more disaggregated levels. More refined prices at the good and sector level and
data being collected at much higher frequencies has led to LOP studies rather than just the
aggregate counterpart of PPP. This field of research has led to lower and lower half-lives
when evaluated at the goods level as we understand more about their aggregation into price
indices. Taylor, for example, suggests the frequency and the nonlinearity of the data plays
significant role in biasing these half-lives upwards and moreover, he shows that these non-
linearities and low frequency data work in conjunction with each other to magnify each
other’s bias effects. As earlier analyses were typically reliant on annual data with linear
specification, half-life estimates can be over one and a half as large as the same data being
estimated with a nonlinear specification and monthly data. Fan and Wei (2006) put this
challenge to the test using a dataset of monthly prices for 92 goods in 36 cities in China.
Using both a Maddala and Wu (1999) test for linear convergence and an ESTAR model
for nonlinear mean reversion, they found that prices overwhelmingly converged to the LOP
and half-lives were on the order of months, rather than the years found by the prior PPP
studies. O’Connell and Wei (2002) look at goods prices and use a model of non-linear
mean reversion for 24 US cities. They find that stationary price dynamics for all cities.
In addition, Imbs et al. (2005) further reduced half-lives by showing a phenomenon
known in the literature as aggregation bias. According to Imbs et al. (2005), current time-
series and econometric methods fail to take into account heterogeneous dynamics in the
goods that comprise the aggregate series. To account for this heterogeneity, they estimate
persistence for a panel of sectoral real exchange rates and then average the half-lives using
the weighted averages of the AR coefficients. By controlling for this bias, they show that
the RER half-life may fall as low as 11 months. Chen and Engel (2005) challenge this view
in a follow-up by first estimating the average half-life across sectors and then averaging the
estimates. By doing so, they show average persistence of sectoral RERs within the range
of the prior literature strengthening the PPP paradox.
Crucini and Shintani (2008) further investigate two phenomena known in the literature
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as categorization and compositional bias. Categorization bias refers to the fact that while
goods may be classified as traded or non-traded for the purposes of creating a price index,
not for calculating LOP deviations. Therefore, there may be positive bias in estimating vari-
ation in the real exchange rate because non-traded goods enter the traded good index and
vice versa. Additionally, Crucini and Shintani point out that many goods use both traded
and non-traded and non-traded components in their production. A beer served in a bar for
example, would be dependent not only on the price of the beer, which could be arbitraged
easily across locations, but also on the labor of the bartender as well, which could not be
transferred with the same ease. Therefore looking at goods level prices, which are aggre-
gates of the inputs used in them, creates upward bias on convergence rates. Using retail
price data from the EIU, they show both strong convergence of prices and lower half-lives
than the consensus estimate. Additionally, they show that the persistence of LOP devia-
tions in traded goods are positive correlated with distribution margin. Although the median
half-life for traded goods only 6 months greater than the non-traded goods’ half-life, this
disparity grows when looking at the inputs rather than the outputs. Thus, they show that
the classical view that traded goods should converge faster than non-traded goods applies
when looking input prices rather than goods prices. Crucini and Landry (2017) further in-
vestigate the role distribution margins play but instead calculate the volatility of traded and
non-traded goods. Using EIU micro-data they challenge the view put forth by Engel (1999)
and add further support to the role played by aggregation bias and compositional bias in
RER volatility.
This paper adds to the whittling down half-life team by using the micro-price dataset
described in Chapter 2. Combining approaches in Crucini and Landry (2017) and Crucini
and Shintani (2008) I find that convergence rates are on the order of months. To test for
aggregation bias, I begin by constructing a price index for each of the 66 bilateral city-pairs
in Ecuador. Using an Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test I show that convergence at the
aggregate price level resembles that of other PPP studies relying on price indexes. These
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unit root rejection rates are similar to the average rejection rates calculated for individ-
ual goods, indicating minimal aggregation bias. Furthermore, comparing the traded and
non-traded indexes with individual traded and non-traded goods, I show that the classical
dichotomy is more appropriate when applied to the index. These results vanish when using
a Im et al. (2003) test at the goods level. In the Ecuadorian data, I can reject the unit root, in
almost every good and all three aggregate indexes. Turning to the question of persistence,
I calculate the half-life of LOP deviations and show that by persistence is extraordinarily
low compared to the consensus estimates. In my data, at the goods level, half-lives are on
the order of months, rather than years, replicating the findings of both Imbs et al. (2005)
and Fan and Wei (2006).
Lastly, I turn to the question of compositional bias. To show the effects, I estimate
parameters for the underlying processes and use those parameters to calculate a mapping
function which relates the underlying coefficients to the index coefficients. This mapping
function shows even the highly stationary goods level prices may be less stationary and have
longer half-lives than the weighted sum of the underlying components. Additionally, if we
treat goods prices as the sum of traded and non-traded inputs, then the process magnifies
itself potentially leading to a unit-root process when aggregated up to a full price index.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 calculates the convergence properties of
the aggregate price indices, traded and non-traded indices, and compares the results with
the convergence properties of the goods prices. Section 3 discusses the presence of the
three biases in the data and estimates the effect these biases may have on results from
the preceding section. Section 4 examines compositional and aggregation bias. Section 5
concludes.
3.2 Unit Root Tests for LOP Convergence
According to the law of one price, two identical goods being sold in different locations
should converge to the same price over time. Econometrically, this means a time series
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of the log difference of prices for a given bilateral city pair should be stationary and de-
viations should converge to zero. However, to fully investigate the impact of aggregation
and categorization bias, I start with a baseline approach that more accurately mirrors what
was done in the earlier literature before the prevalence of micro-data studies. I begin by
testing for convergence at the most aggregated levels, that is I am looking at the RER rather
than deviations in the LOP. To accomplish this task, I first construct a price index for each
city. Although, expenditure weights are not available for the Ecuadorian data, I use equally
weighted good for composite city-level index.1 It should be noted that because we are
only concerned with the intranational real exchange rate, I focus on the CPI for each of the
twelve cities, not the official national CPI released by INEC.
Following the literature, I test for convergence by estimating the following equation.
∆qHjkt = η jk +ρ1q
H
jkt−1+
N
∑
n=1
ρn∆qHjkt−n+ν jkt (3.1)
where qHjkt represents the difference in logs of the price index between cities j and k at
time t. η jkt represents the time-invariant component of the real exchange rate. H = T,N,A
where A is the aggregate price level for the city, T is the traded goods index, and N is the
non-traded goods index.
Following Crucini and Shintani (2008), the good is considered to follow absolute price
convergence if ηi jk = 0 for all j and k and follow conditional price convergence for cases in
which the real exchange rate exhibits some permanent component, η jk, but initial shocks
die out over time. It is assumed that the error term, ν jkt , has a mean of 0 and variance,
σ2ν conditional upon η and the lagged real exchange rate terms. N lags were included
to account for serial correlation where N was chosen to minimize the Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC). Consideration was also given to the Aikaike Information Criterion,
but in almost all cases, the two criteria chose the same lag structure and results were not
1Chapter 2 shows that a constructed price index of equally-weighted goods closely resembles Ecuador’s
official inflation rate. Although I lack accurate data to show this holds true for city aggregates and traded/non-
traded aggregates, I assume expenditure weights across cities are similar to the national average.
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significantly affected.
The first column of Table 3.1 reports the results of the ADF test for the three panels of
price indexes. The column reports the percentage of city pairs that reject the null hypothesis
of a unit root. Accordingly, the unit root can only be rejected about half of of the time for the
full index at the 5% level, which demonstrates a lack of stationarity. However, compared to
other studies of the subject, there exists a large discrepancy between stationarity for traded
goods and non-traded goods with the traded goods seemingly driving the overall RER.
After looking at aggregate price indexes, I then compare the results for stationarity for
price of individual goods. Formally, I estimate the following equation to test for conver-
gence.
∆qi jkt = ηi jk +ρi1qi jkt−1+
N
∑
n=1
ρin∆qi jkt−n+νi jkt (3.2)
where qi jkt represents the difference in logs of the price for good i between cities j and k
at time t. ηi jkt represents the time-invariant component of the real exchange rate. Again,
it is assumed that the error term, νi jk has has a mean of 0 and variance, σ2ν conditional
upon η and the lagged real exchange rate terms. N lags were included to account for
serial correlation where N was chosen to minimize the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC). The bottom rows of Table 3.1 shows the proportion of goods that reject the unit
root demonstrating absolute and relative price convergence. I use INEC’s categorization
of traded and non-traded goods and compare the average rejection frequency across the
classical dichotomy.
While much of the literature goes on to use a standard augmented Dickey-Fuller tests
to estimate the equation above, Levin et al. (2002) have shown that the ADF tests tend to
overly reject the null hypothesis and declare nonstationarity where stationarity is present.
Many studies have used Maddala and Wu (1999) to help correct for this problem. Because
our data forms a balanced panel across all 66 bilateral city pairs, I am able to use the
methods described in Im et al. (2003) which Monte Carlo simulations suggest has even
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greater power and the lower size distortions than Maddalla and Wu’s test. Table 3.2 presents
these results. The lowest for conditional price rejection rate is 98.2 percent convergence at
the 1 percent significance level. These rejection frequencies indicate LOP deviations are
conditionally stationary across all city pairs and goods. Although these results compare
favorably with the LDC results in Crucini and Shintani (2008) they are much higher than
comparable papers in the literature2. The high convergence rates can be explained by a
number of factors. As discussed earlier, Taylor (2001) shows that persistence estimates
are biased upwards with lower frequency data. As the Ecuadorian data uses monthly data
compared to previous studies that frequently relied on quarterly or annual data, convergence
should be stronger. Cheung and Lai (2000) shows faster adjustment of PPP in LDCs due to
higher inflation rates and larger variability in nominal exchange rates. These two features
figure prominently into Ecuador’s history of the observed time period. Lastly, many LOP
and PPP studies focus on international price convergence3. The lack of a border likely
increases the stationarity of our sample.
3.2.1 Persistence in LOP Deviations
Once the stationarity of the panel has been established convincingly, I move on to es-
timate the persistence of the time series equation. In order to do so, I employ a two-step
GMM estimator of ρi based upon the first difference transformation. In order to fully cap-
ture the serial correlation associated with deviation in the real exchange rate, I use 6 lags.
My results were not sensitive to my choice of lag structure. Due to the number of lags, I
choose two separate statistics to measure the persistence of price deviations. The first mea-
sure of persistence is the coefficient on the first autoregressive term, ρi1 By using only the
first autoregressive coefficient, it allows for a simple, intuitive approach and allows more
readily available comparisons across the literature. One problem with this measure is that
2Fan and Wei (2006), for example, have a rejection rate of between 22 percent for services and 71 percent
for perishable consumer goods
3Engel and Rogers (1996), Parsley and Wei (1996), Gopinath et al. (2011)
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much of the deviation may dissipate after the first month but remain for the following pe-
riods. To account for this, I use a second measure of persistence known as the cumulative
impulse response (CIR). The statistic is calculated by
CIR5 =
5
∑
h=1
IRh (3.3)
where IRh represents the impulse response in period h to a unit shock. The CIR shows the
cumulative impact of a shock over the next five periods. This measure takes into account
that a shock my have long-lasting effects on the price deviations and will capture goods in
which deviations fall considerably after the first period but then persist for long periods of
time afterwards.
Engel (1999) divided goods into two different indexes, a tradable RER and a non-
tradable one and showed that there was little difference in the magnitude of RER fluctions
whichever group was used. Table 3.3 shows the estimated half-life and persistence esti-
mates between traded goods and non-traded goods using the classical discrete distinction
between the two. A couple of observations are readily apparent. Firstly, half-lives in our
estimations are on an order months rather than the years suggested by earlier studies. A
number of factors have already been discussed such as high inflation rates and lack of a
border variable. The second observation is that discussed in Crucini and Shintani (2008).
While there is an observable difference between traded goods and non-traded goods, the
half-lives differ only by two months. This is hardly the strong relationship suggested by the
law of one price. Furthermore, Figure 3.1 shows the kernel density estimates for law of one
price deviations. In this data, traded goods have more dispersion than the non-traded goods.
This first possible explanation is through the concept of categorization bias, which refers
to the misplacement of goods into traded and non-traded baskets due to their classification.
The standard example described in Crucini and Shintani (2008) is restaurant food versus
groceries. Both would be listed in Food and Beverage, a traded good, but their tradability
differs vastly. The second type of bias is that we examine in the next section. Goods may
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use both traded and non-traded inputs which consequently have substantive effects on the
persistence of deviations from the law of one price. They call this the compositional bias
of the good.
Table 3.3: Median Persistence Estimates
Half-Life CIR
All Goods 4 3.18
Traded Goods 4 2.98
Non-Traded Goods 6 3.71
Figure 3.1: Kernel Density for the Law of One Price Deviations
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Figure 3.2: Kernel Density of Persistence Estimates
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Figure 3.2 further demonstrates this point with the kernel estimates of the distributions
for ρi1. All persistence estimates are calculated at the goods level. The bottom two panels
show the kernel estimates when looking at traded goods and non-traded goods, respectively.
The magnitude of ρ is much larger than other studies although this is misleading based on
the choice of lag structure, and the frequency of the data. The more interesting magnitudes
can be found in 3.3 the kernel estimates for the distribution of CIR. Again these estimates
are done for persistence at the good level and the bottom panels show densities when goods
are divided for traded and non-traded goods. Looking at the two figures, there are three
readily available observations. First, regardless of the measure, LOP deviations in traded
goods seem to be less persistent. In using ρi1, the median is about 0.15 lower than in the
non-traded goods. In the CIR estimates, the median is 0.73 lower indicating that an LOP
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shock in traded good will have a larger initial dissipation and then continue dissipate faster
after the next four months as well. Second, there is much more variability in the traded
goods persistence estimates than the CIR persistence estimates. Both persistence measures
for traded goods indicate a slight bimodal distribution, while the non-traded goods more
resemble a normal distribution. Lastly, all goods together more closely resemble the traded
goods distribution, but that might be due to the large number of traded goods in the sample
relative to non-traded goods. Despite these differences in the median, the two density
functions are much more similar than they appear at first glance. Although the medians
differ from each other, there is considerable overlap between both traded and non-traded
goods, suggesting that the persistence of traded goods and non-traded goods are not as
different as one might expect from the LOP.
Figure 3.3: Kernel Density Cumulative Impulse Response Estimates
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3.3 Compositional Bias
In the preceding section, I established the difficulty in applying the classical dichotomy
to goods’ prices. In this section, I draw on the work of Crucini and Landry (2017) to
reexamine the classical dichotomy at the input level, rather than at the level of retail goods.
To investigate the degree of compositional bias in our data, I first regress the persistence
estimates on the distribution share. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 present these findings for both mea-
sures of persistence. Regardless of the measure used, there is a clear positive relationship
between the distribution share and persistence showing that persistence in LOP deviations
is much greater in goods that use more non-traded inputs. Looking at the two graphs, while
both measures of persistence of a positive relationship, the relationship is much stronger
when the CIR5 is used. This suggests that a shock to the LOP might dissipate at a similar
rate at first, but over the following months, the residual deviation is more likely to remain
in the good with a higher distribution share. Taken together, these graphs both reiterate the
point in Crucini and Shintani (2008) that the classical dichotomy should be applied at the
inputs level rather than the retail level. One other point of interest are the two extremes of
the sectoral distribution shares.
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Figure 3.4: Sectoral-mean first order autocorrelation estimates against sectoral distribution
shares
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Figure 3.5: Sectoral-mean CIR estimates against sectoral distribution shares
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In order to examine this relationship further, I begin by assuming goods are Cobb-
Douglas in traded and non-traded inputs following the literature as precedent4. Formally, I
define the price of good i in city j at time t as
Pi jt =W
αi
jt T
1−αi
i jt (3.4)
where Ti jt represents the traded component for of the price of good i in city j at time
t. Wjt represents the non-traded component in city j at time t. This component captures
distribution costs, rents, and other non-traded inputs involved in the production of good
i. Taking logs and subtracting the price across cities, I arrive at the LOP deviation for an
4Crucini et al. (2005) and Engel and Rogers (1996) among others
59
individual good i as
qi jkt = αiw jkt +(1−αi)τi jkt (3.5)
where w jkt and ti jkt are the relative cost of non-traded and trade inputs, respectively, faced
by retailers in locations j and k for each good i.
To dig further into the mechanics behind how compositional bias can occur, I simplify
analysis into the traded component and the non-traded component and assume each follows
an autoregressive process with one lag and abstracts from differences across location pairs.
wt = ρNwt−1+ εN,t (3.6)
τit = ρT τit−1+ εT,t (3.7)
where wt represents the non-traded component of the relative price and τit represents the
traded component. Using equation 3.5 above, the covariance between the relative price and
its first lagged term are
cov(qit ,qit−1) = cov(αiwt +(1−α)τit ,αwt−1+(1−αi)τit−1) (3.8)
Assuming the shocks are identically and independently distributed, we can further as-
sume cov(wt ,τt−1) = cov(wt−1,τt) = 0. Therefore equation 3.8 simplifies to
cov(qit ,qit−1) = α2i cov(wt ,wt−1)+(1−αi)2cov(τit ,τit−1) (3.9)
We can then use equation 3.9 to calculate the autorrelation coefficient.
ρi =
cov(qit ,qit−1)
var(qit)
= α2i
cov(wt ,wt−1)
var(qit)
+(1−αi)2 cov(τit ,τit−1)var(qit) (3.10)
Multiplying the first term on the left-hand side by var(wt) and the second term var(τit),
I arrive at the autoregressive coefficient where
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ρi = α2i
var(wt)
var(qit)
cov(wt ,wt−1)
var(wt)
+(1−α)2 var(τit)
var(qit)
cov(τit ,τit−1)
var(τit)
= ψiρN +(1−ψi)ρT
(3.11)
where
ψi =
α2i var(wt)
α2var(wt)+(1−α)2var(τit)
1−ψi = (1−αi)
2var(τit)
α2var(wt +(1−α)2var(τTit )
(3.12)
Finally, using the fact that the variance of the non-traded and traded relative prices are
var(qNt ) =
σ2N
1−ρ2N
var(qTit ) =
σ2iT
1−ρ2T
(3.13)
We can substitute them into equation 3.12 and we have
ψi =
α2i
σ2N
1−ρ2N
α2i
σ2N
1−ρ2N
+(1−αi)2 σ
2
T
1−ρ2T
1−ψi =
(1−αi)2 σ
2
T
1−ρ2T
α2i
σ2N
1−ρ2N
+(1−αi)2 σ
2
T
1−ρ2T
(3.14)
This demonstrates the highly-nonlinear relationship of the bias toward the high persis-
tence component due to its appearance in the weight, ψi. The key insight here is that the
whole is not the weighted sum of the parts.
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3.3.1 Estimation
To demonstrate this nonlinear relationship and the impact of aggregating the traded and
non-traded components into one price, I calculate the function mapping the relationship
between αi and ψi using reasonable parameters estimated from the Ecuadorian data. In the
model of the previous section, we can observe the persistence parameters of the relative
price, but the traded persistence parameter ρT , non-traded persistence parameter, ρN , the
variance of the traded process σT , and the variance of the non-traded process, σN remain
unobserverable. To recover these unobservables, I first consider the following AR(1)
qi jkt = ρiqi jkt−1+ εit (3.15)
I perform the regression separately for each city pair and take the median for each good
to form ρi. I also take the variance for each process and take median across those values.
In order to back out the unobservable ρT and ρN , I order the ρi from the least persistent to
most persistent and take the top and bottom deciles5. On the ends of the traded non-traded
distribution is where I am most likely to find ρT isolated from the effects of ρN and vice
versa. In addition, I take the variance of those processes estimate σT and σN . Table 3.4
shows the estimated persistence and variance parameters.
The estimated ρT and ρN parameters is striking. ρN is extremely persistent with a half-
life is 53.5 6 or the equivalent of 4.5 years. Its traded counterpart is a mere 2.3 months.
These parameters indicate a very strong role being played in the LOP, but the effects are
muted when combined with each other. Also, the variance of the non-traded process is
about 3.2 times the variance of the traded process. The greater volatility of this non-traded
process is what drives the mapping of ψi.
5Not surprisingly, the least persistent ρ’s came from the goods with the lowest distribution margins and
vice versa.
6In the AR(1) model with an autoregressive coefficient of ρ , the half-life is simply 11−ρ .
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Table 3.4: Estimated parameters of the AR(1) model
ρT 0.5688
var(qTit ) 0.0023
ρN 0.9813
var(qNt ) 0.0074
3.3.2 Results
The blue line in figure 3.6 shows the estimate of each ψi for each value of αi. The black
45 degreee line is added as a reference. If the two processes were weighted in proportion
to their share, the ψi function would be identical to the 45 degree line where αi = ψi.
However, one can see the nonlinear relationship between ψi and αi. The function has three
notable features. Trivially, at values of 0 and 1, the impact of a purely traded good or non-
traded good, ψi = αi so both components of the weighted process have the same impact as
their weight would suggest because there is only one subprocess contributing to the overall
process.
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Figure 3.6: ψi Function
A more notable feature is observed at the tail ends of the function. This means that
for low values of alpha, αi > ψi and αi < ψi at the higher distribution margins. Take for
instance αi = 0.10. In this good, 10 percent of the cost structure comes from the non-traded
component, but the non-traded AR process only has a weight of 0.037. In such a case, a
good that is heavily dependent on traded inputs may take exhibit stationrity and persistence
properties even more closely aligned with the traded component than the input shares would
suggest. Looking at figure 3.5 above, we see this to some extent. As αi approaches 0, for
example, the dots demonstrate stronger persistence than the regression would indicate. The
reverse is true as alpha approaches 0. A good like gasoline, where the distribution margin
is 0.167, will take on a larger proportion of the traded AR process and magnify the effects.
The interior point at αi = ψi = 0.24 suggests that this effect might be rare to observe
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in practice. Most goods have an alpha of greater than 0.24 and therefore were more likely
to take on properties of the non-traded process. In our sample only four goods had a
distribution margin less than 0.247. In the other 219 goods, the ψi function would work
to make goods more similar to each other. We see this play out in the data, in figure 3.3,
we see the kernel density distribution of for both traded and non-traded goods. For traded
goods, there are two humps. One with considerably lower persistence estimates than the
rest of the data. The second hump resembles the kernel density estimate for the non-traded
goods. Comparing this to the present analysis, there are two types of traded goods. Goods
with distribution margins of less than 0.24 (or at least very close to that distribution margin)
will take be heavily weighted towards the traded process. However, for a large proportion
of the traded goods, they will look exactly the non-traded goods, not only because they
use a larger share of non-traded inputs, but also because the non-traded input process has a
disproportionate influence on overall process.
The third and most notable feature of the ψi function is that based on the estimated
parameters, the center of the psi function is to the northwest corner of the graph. At αi =
0.5, ψi is much greater coming in at 0.7579. This indicates that there is a general bias
towards the highly persistent non-traded process. A good that uses equal parts traded and
non-traded goods will still take on much more of the non-traded process than the traded
process leading to lower rates of convergence or longer persistence. This explains how a
number of studies of the law of one price have shown significant overlap in the persistence
estimates of traded and non-traded goods.
Taken together, these facts stregthen the case for the classical dichotomy but with the
caveat that it be applied at the most fundamental level. In the Ecuadorian dataset, traded
goods have a general tendeny to exhibit lower levels of persistence compared to non-traded
goods, but even this is misleading. By estimating the individual ρT and ρN the traded input
has a half-life on the order of months, while the non-traded half-life is on the order of
7Gasoline, automobiles, shrimp, and fish
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years. Therefore, it is not sufficient to say that traded and non-traded goods have similar
persistence estimates because they are a combination of traded and non-traded inputs. They
are also upward biased because the non-traded input has a disproportionate influence on the
overall process.
3.4 Conclusion
Using panel unit root tests, my results show that retail prices in Ecuador overwhelm-
ingly converge to purchasing power parity in both a relative sense and traded goods are
substantially stationary in an absolute sense. Dividing goods up into a traded index and
a non-traded index only present a more complicated picture. Non-traded goods especially
have difficulty converging to purchasing power parity. However, the unit root is rejected
and the half-life of LOP deviations is on the order of months, not years. This shows the
PPP paradox may partly be explained by the lack of micro-data and the use of aggregate in-
dexes to show the connection between prices in different locations. While the PPP paradox
is alive and well, its implications may be weaker than previously assumed.
This bias continues even for the highly converging goods prices. Results show that
estimating an AR(1) process, as much as the literature has done, can lead to results that
fail to account for the stationarity of the underlying processes. Goods prices that are a
combination of traded and non-traded inputs are not equally affected by their parts.
Finally, this study provides the first rigorous empirical study on the law of one price in
Ecuador. Morever this study helps confirm the existence of compositional bias and how it
works to nullify the important effects a good’s tradeability has on deviations from similar
priced goods in other markets.
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Chapter 4
Exchange Rate Pass-through in Ecuadorian Cities
4.1 Introduction
Exchange rate pass-through is an area of interest that has spanned both time and fields.
In short, pass-through describes how an increase in the cost of inputs can lead to an increase
in the price the consumer pays. While earlier examinations focused on domestically cen-
tered costs, more recent applications have migrated to international finance and the costs
associated with imports and exports. In this specific context, the question is how a change
in the exchange rate impacts prices at the retail level. While the LOP and exchange rate
pass-through are related, the previous chapter focused on prices and their relationship to
each other within the country of Ecuador. The primary endeavor of this chapter is to see
the movement of prices in response to an external shock, specifically the exchange rate.
Although exchange rate pass-through is typically a point along a continuum, the lit-
erature has narrowed the discussion by describing opposing theories, labeling them local-
currency pricing (LCP) and producer-currency-pricing (PCP). Local-currency pricing refers
to the idea that prices are denoted in the local currency. Therefore a change in the exchange
rate would have little to no effect on the prices in the destination country. As such, changes
in the nominal exchange rate would have real effects. As the nominal price remains con-
stant, the real import price is affected. Producer-currency pricing refers to a situation of
full pass-through where prices are continuously updated with information on the exchange
rate. Therefore, as the exchange rate changes, import prices would change along with them
and goods would fully reflect the exchange rate shock. PCP, on the other hand, is indicative
of a situation with complete pass-through. As the exchange rate changes, these variations
are fully reflected in the price and therefore adjust at the exact same magnitude as the
change in the exchange rate. A shift of producers’ imported costs would be passed down
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to consumers.
Despite these two diametrically opposed views, empirical evidence to date indicates
some mix of PCP and LCP, but that both consumer and producer prices tend more to the
LCP side of the argument. Prices of a good are largely unaffected by the exchange rate.
Goldberg and Campa (2010) provides some the earliest work on the subject comparing
pass-through in 23 OECD countries. They show average short-run pass-through of 0.46
and long-run pass-through of 0.64. At the same time, they show pass-through is highly
dependent on the country studied with Ireland’s pass-through being 0.16 and 0.79. Many
other papers have replicated these results. Gopinath et al. (2010b) constructs a measure
called life-long pass-through (LLPT) and show that it is just 28 percent in the US, matching
CG with a LRPT of 23 percent.
Despite a general consensus towards LCP for most retail prices, border prices typically
do reflect these shocks to the exchange rates. Burstein et al. (2003b) show that the degree
of measured pass-through is dependent on whether the prices used are in the import price
index or the consumer price index with the former tending to PCP. Another important
finding in the empirical literature is that real exchange rates of tradable goods typically
comove with the nominal exchange rate even when the goods are produced in the same
location. Nakamura (2008) uses suggests that price variance occurs more dramatically
at the retail level and the variance is the result of dynamic pricing strategies by retailers.
Therefore, as the nominal exchange rate changes, the retail price of the good stays the same
indicating a strong role of LCP even when taking differing production prices into account.
Such a finding indicates some role demand plays in the pass-through.
Distance is not a new area of study for price dynamics, but typically these studies
involving distance focus on international borders. In a seminal paper, Engel and Rogers
(1996) shows that that two cities located further away do have a greater discrepancy in their
price, but that the border adds the equivalent volatility of 75,000 miles. Parsley and Wei
(1996) replicates this experiment with US and Japanese cities and again finds that estimates
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43,000 trillion miles. According to Parsley and Wei (1996) distance, unit-shipping costs,
and exchange rate variability all explain international market segmentation.
Typically, the exchange rate pass-through literature is intimately connected with the
LOP and PPP literature presented in previous section. A change in the exchange rate ul-
timately impacts the deviations between two prices. If pass-through were strong, then the
LOP would hold more fundamentally. As we have seen though, PCP is not the dominant
theory to apply. In the present study, while the previous paper focused on the relative price
discrepancies of cities to each other, this paper’s lies clearly in the realm of how prices react
to an external shock in the form of the exchange rate. I abstract from the direct relationship
between two cities’ prices and focus more on the distance of each city from the coast.
This paper looks to add details to the literature on pass-through. In this paper, I examine
the degree of pass-through across two separate dimensions: goods and cities. By using an
empirical model similar to Goldberg and Campa (2010), I predict implications for how we
expect pass-through to vary by city and by good. I then run estimates across cities and
goods report the findings.
4.2 The Geography of Ecuador
In addition to the reasons discussed in prior chapters, Ecuador’s geography provides a
strong motivation for examining pass-through within the country. Figure 4.1 shows a map
of Ecuador and many of Ecuador’s largest cities. The twelve red dots represent the twelve
cities in the sample. Ecuador is divided geographically and culturally into three regions.
The first region is called La Costa and reprents the western coastal region on Ecuador’s
border with the Pacific Ocean. This region contains Guayaquil, the country’s largest city
as well as Esmereldas, Portoviejo, Machala, and Manta. The second region is known as
La Sierra or the central mountainous region containing the Andes Mountains and a number
of volcanos. Quito, the capital of Ecuador is located in the Northern part of the region. In
addition, it contains the other The final Eastern region is known as El Oriente, which is
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largely characterized by the Amazonian rainforest. This is area is very sparsely populated
and due to its lack of major cities, does not appear in ther dataset.
Figure 4.1: Map of Ecuador
Red dots on the map indicate the twelve cities used in the INEC price database.
Geography plays a large role here because the motivation for examining cities is based
upon the idea that imported goods, are purchased at the border and shipped to the interior
of the country. As a result, provides a direct comparison with the model where goods will
70
essentially be imported into La Costa and then combined with non-traded labor in order to
distribute the goods to La Sierra. Table 4.1 lists the 12 cities, their population 2001, and
their distance from the coast.
Table 4.1: Ecuadorian Cities
City Population Distance from Coast Region
Esmeraldas 95,124 0 Coastal
Guayaquil 1,985,379 0 Coastal
Machala 204,578 0 Coastal
Manta 183,105 0 Coastal
Portoviejo 171,847 13 Coastal
Ambato 154,095 135 Sierra
Cuenca 277,374 59 Sierra
Latacunga 51,689 131 Sierra
Loja 118,532 74 Sierra
Quito 1,399,378 110 Sierra
Riobamba 124,807 103 Sierra
Quevedo 120,379 74 Sierra
4.2.1 Empirical Strategy
This paper’s empirical strategy resembles that of Campa and Goldberg (2005) and oth-
ers in the literature. Campa and Goldberg (2005) suggest that pass-through can vary signif-
icantly from country to country based on the types of prices. Pass-through is usually much
more visible in border prices while less so in retail prices.
To set the baseline, I first estimate pass-through for Ecuador. The first specification
considered looks at pass-through for a variety of goods.
∆pt = α+
4
∑
k=0
βk∆et−k +
4
∑
k=0
γt∆wt−k + εt (4.1)
where pt represents a consumer price index comprising retail prices of goods and services
from Ecuador’s national statistical agency INEC. wt−k is the wage which I use as a control
for retailer costs. et−k represents the official exchange rate from the International Financial
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Statistics database. In order to get a complete measure, I use a trade weighted exchange rate
based on the value of imports of Ecuador’s top 30 trading partners. Figure 4.2 shows the
log changes in the exchange rate weighted by the both imports and exports. The choice of
weighting by imports or by exports seems to be largely irrelevant. To construct my measure
of the exchange rate I use the export-weighted exchange rate.
Figure 4.2: Weighted Exchange Rate
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One key obstacle with running this regression at such a detailed the city and good level,
is that wage data is not available at a monthly frequency. In order to proxy for this wage,
one could simply use haircuts to represent wage, but such a measure might be biased by
haircut seasonality or demand shocks. To help alleviate these concerns, I take an average of
prices with the highest nontraded input shares based on the data from Chapter 2 and create
an index of the prices with each good receiving an equal weight.
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In the baseline specification, I use a composite of all 223 goods in the database an esti-
mate pass-through which represents a Consumer Price Index. The results of my estimation
can be found in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2: Pass-through into CPI
Coefficient β SE tStat pValue
α 0.00716 0.00502 1.43 0.1591
∆et -0.14056 0.03031 -4.64 0.0000
∆et−1 -0.19847 0.02964 -6.70 0.0000
∆et−2 -0.11568 0.02847 -4.06 0.0001
∆et−3 -0.10386 0.03007 -3.45 0.0010
∆et−4 -0.05218 0.03037 -1.72 0.0910
∆wt 0.15170 0.07438 2.04 0.0458
∆wt−1 0.02511 0.06328 0.40 0.6929
∆wt−2 0.02264 0.06395 0.35 0.7246
∆wt−3 -0.01532 0.06208 -0.25 0.8060
∆wt−4 0.05317 0.06070 0.88 0.3846
Long-run pass-through = -0.61075
There are two numbers of interest. The first is simply the coefficient attached to the
contemporaneous exchange rate. This value represents the short-run elasticity and mea-
sures the immediate impact of the exchange rate on price. In 4.2, you can see that Ecuador
as a whole has a short-run elasticity of -0.141 and that this coefficient is significantly dif-
ferent from both zero and one. The coefficient itself is negative because exchange rates are
denominated with the Ecuador’s currency in the denominator. Therefore a decrease in the
exchange rate represents a depreciation of the currency and vice versa. In this case, a neg-
ative value signifies what is typically true in exchange rate pass-through - an appreciation
of the foreign currency leads to an increase in the prices in local currency units.
The second number of interest comes from CG and is referred to as the long run elas-
ticity. It is calculated by summing the coefficients on the four lagged exchange rate terms
with the short run elasticity. In our baseline specification, long-run pass-through is -0.61
which indicates that a 1 percent appreciation in the exchange rate leads to a 0.61 percent
increase in the price.
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Two important benchmarks in comparing these pass-through numbers relate to 0 and -1.
Pass-through of zero indicates that a change in the exchange rate has no impact on prices, a
phenomenon referred to Local Currency Pricing or LCP. On the other hand, pass-through of
1 indicates that movements in the exchange rate are fully passed on to consumers. In all of
the regresssions to follow, discussion is made as to whether the estimate differ significantly
from 0 and -1.
Compared to CG, both of the numbers compare favorably. Goldberg and Campa (2010)
find an average short-run pass-through of 0.46 and long-run pass-through of 0.64. Ecuador
has a low degree of short-run pass-through, but its long-run pass-through is extremely close
to CG’s average. Ecuador’s low rate of pass-through is mildly puzzling as countries with
higher exchange rate volatility typically experience more pass-through, but it should be
noted that while some periods of the sample have large movements in the exchange rate, the
final third of the sample includes a fully fixed exchange rate in the form of dollarization with
Ecuador’s largest trading partner, the United States. Furthermore, the literature has shown
that macroeconomic volatility has little impact on pass-through, so while the exchange rate
did experience rapid movement over the sample’s years, the crisis was primarily a monetary
one, with little impact on the degree of pass-through within Ecuador.
4.2.2 Pass-through by Good
We now turn to looking at pass-through for each individual good in the sample. We use
a similar regression to the baseline specification, but rather than a composite price index,
we estimate pass-through using each individual good. Cities are aggregated into a national
average provided by INEC. I use the specification below to estimate the pass-through.
∆pit = αi+
4
∑
k=0
βik∆et−k +
4
∑
k=0
γt∆wt−k + εit (4.2)
Again, the short-run pass-through is defined as the contemporaneous coefficient to the
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exchange rate, βi0 and long-run pass-through is defined as the sum of all the coefficients on
the exchange rates, ∑4k=0βk.
Complete results are presented in Table D.1 in the Appendix. Overall, the results paint
a mixed picture. The degree of pass-through varies dramatically depending on the good in
question and unlike the aggregate picture which followed neither LCP or PCP, many goods
do not reject either one. One particular dimension that might relate to the degree of pass-
through is the degree to which the good or service uses non-traded inputs in production.
Although the evidence is mixed, the non-traded goods seem to have less pass-through when
compared to their traded counterparts. Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.4 plot the nontraded share
against SR and LR pass-through, respectively. We can see that in this connection be non-
traded goods and pass-through is much more pronounced. Such a result is not surprising.
If a good requires more use of local inputs in order to produce the good, exchange rate
pass-through will be muted by the non-traded component.
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Figure 4.3: Nontraded Input Share versus Short-Run Pass-through
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Figure 4.4: Nontraded Input Share versus Long-Run Pass-through
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4.2.3 Pass-through by Cities
While many papers have investigated the empirics behind the first two specifications,
this paper adds to the literature by examing the pass-through to individual cities in the same
country. In particular, we look at how pass-through affects cities based on their distance
from the coastline. The motivating factor here is the goods receive traded imports from
the docks and then use non-traded inputs to distribute that throughout the country. If this
reasoning is correct, we should expect to see more pass-through in cities located in La
Costa and less pass-through in cities located in La Sierra. In order to investigate this more
fully, we use a similar regression to baseline regression, but rather than aggregating cities
into a national average, we take a consumer price index for each of the twelve cities. The
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specification for this regression is
∆p jt = α j +
4
∑
k=0
β jk∆et−k +
4
∑
k=0
γt∆w j,t−k + ε jt (4.3)
Results are summarized in Table 4.3. The first noticable difference from the good-
specific regressions is that pass-through is much more similar across cities than it is across
goods. In fact, when comparing pass-through among the cities, all cities can reject both
PCP and LCP. In the table, the first five cities represent coastal cities. Pass-through does
seem to exhibit slightly more PCP characteristics in the coastal cities, but the difference is
minimal as no city deviates more than 0.017 from the average.
Table 4.3: Pass-through by city
Cities SR Pass-through LR Pass-through
Esmeraldas -0.136 -0.592
Guayaquil -0.139 -0.606
Machala -0.135 -0.589
Manta -0.148 -0.580
Portoviejo -0.145 -0.585
Ambato -0.122 -0.607
Cuenca -0.123 -0.606
Latacunga -0.127 -0.606
Loja -0.122 -0.604
Quito -0.124 -0.600
Riobamba -0.122 -0.600
Quevedo -0.131 -0.596
Average -0.131 -0.598
4.2.4 Pass-through and Distance from the Coast
To investigate this relationship between coastal differences and more fully, I rerun the
regression with an interaction term to determine
∆pi jt = αi j +
4
∑
k=0
βkdist j∆et−k +
4
∑
k=0
γt∆w j,t−k + εit (4.4)
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In addition to the usual variables, dist j represents the distance of the city from the coast.
Here the meaning of βk changes. Table D.2 shows the results for each good. However, the
coefficients no longer represent elasticity of exchange rate pass-through. It now shows
the both pass-through and the impact of coastal distance on pass-through. Although at
first glance, the results seem small, there are two important conclusions to draw from this
regression. The first point of notice is that both for the SR and the LR, the coefficients have
generally flipped from negative to positive. As we have seen, the pass-through component
of the coefficient is negative, so a positive coefficient points towards a negative distance
effect. This implies that interior cities do in fact have less pass-through than their coastal
counterparts. Furthermore, while the magnitude is small, it is significant for all goods.
These results are consistent with a model where firms import traded goods and distribute
them throughout the country.
4.3 Conclusion
While narrow in scope, this paper uses a novel data set to show the dynamics of price
pass-through within Ecuador. Using the Ecuadorian price data of the previous two chapters,
this paper confirms that while Ecuador experiences similar pass-through phenomena as
other countries, cities respond differently to exchange rates based on distance from the
coast. Furthermore, this paper provides further empirical evidence relating pass-through
on the non-tradability of goods and services.
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Appendix D
Pass-through Regression Results
Table D.1: Pass-through by Goods
Goods SR Pass-through LR Pass-through
Rice -0.16885 -1.05094 +
Oat meal -0.13998 * -0.89705 +
Cereal -0.00229 * -0.68506 +
Spaghetti 0.088999 * -0.61859 *+
Bread -0.32191 -0.59478 +
Beef, with bone -0.12604 * -0.94489 +
Beef, without bone -0.1106 * -0.86289 +
Chicken -0.13283 * -0.84809 +
Shrimp -0.4368 -0.92485 +
Fish, fresh -0.0683 * -0.73922 *+
Tuna, can -0.20132 -0.80516 +
Sardines in can -0.21911 -0.87319 +
Milk, powder -0.10174 * -0.34051 *
Milk, fresh, homogenized/pasteurized -0.08463 * -0.64768 +
Cheese -0.02782 * -0.52084 *+
Eggs -0.70149 -0.85432 *+
Oil, vegetable -0.47074 -0.79988 *+
Vegetable fat -0.09263 * -0.63042 +
Margarine -0.32335 -0.85044 +
Avocado -0.33085 * -0.57746 *+
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Bananas -0.01482 * -0.26952 *+
Lemons -0.32306 *+ 0.285648 *+
Apples -0.2587 * -0.95011 *+
Raspberries -0.01328 * -0.50166 *+
Oranges -0.73515 + -0.11665 *+
Naranjilla -0.46219 -0.58879 *+
Papaya 0.053782 * -0.2019 *+
Pineapple -0.14633 * -0.36494 *+
Plantain -0.37447 -0.59206 *+
Watermelon -0.0834 * -0.71268 *+
Tomatillo -0.28663 -0.53196 *+
Grapes -0.19351 * -0.39946 *+
Fruit cocktail, can -0.07512 * -0.79064 +
Raisins -0.07604 * -0.97604 +
Peas, fresh -0.33741 * -1.41037 *+
Onion, white -0.30296 * -0.27304 *+
Onion, red -0.45289 -1.26098 *+
Cabbage 0.038886 * -0.67466 *+
Cauliflower -0.01812 * -0.84972 *+
Corn, fresh -0.49203 -0.30508 *+
Broad beans, fresh -0.31568 -0.79927 *+
Beans, fresh -0.31628 -0.85851 *+
Lettuce -0.23229 * -0.62847 *+
Bell pepper -0.2383 * 0.151274 *+
Tomatoes -0.23448 * -0.30962 *+
Peas, dry -0.12947 -0.68949 +
Beans, dry -0.1219 * -0.43941 *+
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Lentils -0.50455 -0.89183 +
Peanuts -0.28611 -0.33423 *+
Potatoes -0.13851 * -1.26579 *+
Yucca -0.26941 * -0.22373 *+
Carrots -0.13754 * -0.46767 *+
Sugar -0.67976 -1.07589 *+
Chocolate, candy 0.036956 * -0.53338 +
Candy 0.048292 * -0.64005 *+
Gelatine -0.16394 -0.5254 *+
Marmalade -0.14746 -0.60556 +
Honey 0.046626 * -0.4876 *+
Panela -0.03765 * -1.12049 +
Garlic -0.12017 * -0.27536 *+
Salt -0.21968 -0.64735 *+
Ketchup -0.16011 -0.6181 +
Broad beans, flour -0.09514 * -0.47592 *+
Soup, dry -0.20321 -0.72971 +
Coffee, ground 0.092544 * -0.60992 *+
Coffee, instant 0.097597 * -0.72206 +
Cocoa -0.19314 -0.2637 *
Mineral water 0.023499 * -0.33708 *
Soft drink, store -0.0943 * -0.65386 *+
Orange juice -0.2305 -0.74351 +
Soft drink in powder 0.009864 * -0.5565 *+
Beer, at store -0.04729 * -0.60158 *+
Rum -0.05193 * -0.54296 +
Wine -0.02552 * -0.55596 *+
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Cigarrettes -0.69308 -1.06581 +
Cassimere, fabric -0.08404 * -0.87036 +
Chalis, fabric -0.26259 -0.93817 +
Silk, fabric -0.14926 -0.76832 +
Dress for woman, making 0.06261 * -0.15537 *
Pants for man, making 0.034099 * -0.31125 *
Suit for man, making 0.00387 * -0.17787 *
Socks, mens -0.18709 -0.82021 +
Underwear, mens -0.11042 * -0.67709 +
Shirt, mens -0.17019 -0.71016 +
T-shirt, mens -0.20641 -0.63003 +
Pants, mens -0.11724 -0.62013 +
Shorts, for sports, mens -0.05413 * -0.76882 *+
Suit for men -0.12452 * -0.61106 *+
T-shirt, childrens -0.13363 * -0.83983 *+
Pants, boys -0.30025 -0.8023 +
Blouse, womens, typical -0.19848 -0.7254 *+
Underwear, womens 0.06721 * -0.73013 +
T-shirt, womens -0.20954 -0.85063 +
Skirt, womens -0.13764 * -0.59236 *+
Pantyhose, nylon -0.07531 * -1.33556 +
Pants, womens -0.03655 * -0.68408 +
Dress, womens -0.0172 * -0.30352 *+
Pants, girls -0.14525 -0.76712 +
Underwear, girls -0.19606 -0.61492 +
Dress, girls -0.2577 -0.57269 *+
Shirt, babies -0.07645 * -0.62145 *+
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Suit for baby -0.00342 * -0.75207 *+
Shoes, leather, mens -0.02186 * -0.71941 +
Shoes, sneakers, mens -0.09487 * -0.98757 +
Shoes, boys 0.033529 * -0.41667 *+
Shoes, leather, womens -0.03067 * -0.61568 +
Shoes, sneakers, womens -0.1655 -0.74533 *+
Shoes, girls -0.23454 -0.73353 *+
Shoe polish -0.16201 * -0.96632 +
Shoe polishing -0.00148 * -0.11149 *
Shoe repair -0.08655 * -0.42763 *+
Rent of house, typical 0.029897 * 0.1209 *
Rent of apartment, typical 0.008048 * 0.156207 *
Rent of room, efficiency 0.024913 * 0.095346 *
Water (utility) 0.011603 * -0.2306 *+
Electricity -0.28524 * -0.35611 *+
Gas, natural, domestic -0.51852 *+ 0.013759 *+
Cupboard, wooden -0.03593 * -0.53473 *+
Bed, wooden -0.28284 -0.6246 *+
Chest of drawers, wooden -0.1318 * -0.48205 *+
Dining set -0.14121 -0.56527 *+
Living room set -0.19926 -0.5666 *+
Blanket, thick, very warm -0.19893 -0.81868 +
Blanket, thick, warm -0.11115 -0.77301 +
Mattress -0.0867 * -0.83234 +
Blanket, thin 0.030783 * -0.64127 +
Towel -0.09324 * -0.72529 +
Stove, gas -0.67428 -1.1066 +
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Blender -0.67208 -1.18155 +
Sewing machine -0.52896 -1.00985 +
Iron, electric -0.73383 -1.15478 +
Refrigerator -0.93868 + -1.05517 +
Light bulb, typical -0.13308 -0.87671 +
Pot, cooking -0.21042 -1.04593 +
Cup with dish -0.00516 * -0.64972 *+
Glass -0.39931 -1.09949 +
Bleach, for laundry -0.25308 -0.79855 +
Disinfectant, domestic -0.29177 -0.77875 +
Detergent -0.51577 -1.05531 +
Broom 0.126134 * -0.50116 *+
Matches -0.1207 -0.68757 +
Soap for dishwashing -0.50585 -0.47767 *+
Soap for laundry -0.25898 -0.51953 *+
Toilet Paper -0.06208 * -0.94684 +
Laundry service 0.094109 * -0.30584 *
Dry cleaning 0.055204 * -0.33904 *
Medicines in general 0.022631 * -0.69931 +
Aspirin (medicine) 0.002462 * -0.92938 +
Linconcin (medicine) 0.239251 -0.49222 *+
Flagil (medicine) -0.01988 * -0.45481 *+
Garamicina (medicine) 0.069526 * -0.43418 *
Neurobion (medicine) 0.010319 * -0.73081 +
Voltaren (medicine) -0.06148 * -0.49371 *+
Megacilina (medicine) 0.102055 * -0.59091 +
Apronax (medicine) 0.170957 -0.72749 +
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Redoxon (medicine) 0.094518 * -0.71787 *+
Hepabionta (medicine) 0.032122 * -0.58064 *+
Milk of magnesia 0.204476 * -1.08769 +
Baycuten, cream (medicine) -0.27797 -0.9776 *+
Comtrex (medicine) -0.13848 * -1.24643 +
Mucosolvan (medicine) -0.03549 * -0.68866 +
Cataflam (medicine) 0.071179 * -0.34937 *
Fungirex (medicine) 0.146383 * -0.42768 *+
Imodium (medicine) 0.142348 * -0.64447 *+
Acrosin-B (medicine) 0.118511 * -0.33427 *+
Glasses -0.49584 -0.67127 +
Doctors visit 0.06611 * -0.06422 *
Lab test, typical medical -0.11664 * -0.22888 *
Automobile or pick-up truck -0.81658 -0.89489 +
Bicycle, typical -0.6014 -1.06394 +
Tire, with tube if needed -0.51506 -0.78169 *+
Automobile tune-up -0.52119 -0.97162 +
Gasoline -0.68749 + -0.10711 *+
Inter-province trip 0.180541 * -0.29072 *+
Transportation, public in bus 0.276995 * -0.28761 *+
Taxi, urban -0.08713 * -0.17047 *+
Sound system, stereo -0.90995 + -1.09562 +
TV set, color -0.73234 -1.18387 +
VCR -0.83738 -0.98081 +
Soccer ball -0.31995 -1.09594 +
Entertainment, dancing -0.03423 * -0.4961 *+
Soccer game -0.03526 * 0.164122 *+
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Rent of VHS movie 0.081671 * -0.24612 *
Newspaper -0.47877 -0.49839 *+
Magazine -0.36006 -0.44521 *+
Uniform for school 0.081965 * 0.065257 *+
Tuition, kindergarden 0.044754 * 0.194971 *
Tuition, primary school 0.120723 * -0.04002 *
Registration, secondary school 0.000463 * 0.179596 *
Tuition, secondary school 0.040867 * 0.160091 *
Registration, university 0.026467 * 0.009228 *
Typewriter -0.64322 -1.2142 +
School supplies in general 0.242934 -0.33479 *+
Book, primary school (typical) 0.202518 -0.20987 *+
Notebook for primary school 0.307758 -0.46982 *+
Compass, drawing, primary school 0.243352 * -0.40985 *+
Ruler, primary school 0.211621 * -0.39445 *+
Pen for primary school 0.32883 -0.50861 *+
Notebook for secundary school 0.246322 -0.42304 *+
Folder 0.279094 -0.41122 *+
Paper, bond 0.283489 -0.55887 *+
Geometry set for school 0.119225 * -0.31337 *+
Ruler, secondary school 0.180225 * -0.37224 *+
Pen for secundary school 0.323097 -0.51638 *+
Algebra book 0.276424 -0.41665 *+
Dictionary for school 0.031027 * 0.167051 *+
Lunch, typical -0.06832 * -0.28239 *
Chicken, rotisserie -0.06261 * -0.7511 *+
Soft drink, at bar -0.1024 * -0.30759 *
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Beer, at bar -0.09365 * -0.48671 *+
Lodging, typical -0.15044 * -0.16189 *+
Haircut 0.07776 * -0.12648 *
Cologne -0.06853 * -0.6005 *+
Cream, moisturizer -0.20178 -0.86254 +
Deodorant -0.02531 * -0.93229 +
Soap, deodorant -0.01514 * -0.98439 +
Razor, standard manual -0.03963 * -1.03826 +
Diapers, disposable for children -0.46895 -1.17043 +
Toothpaste -0.35977 -0.96528 +
Shampoo 0.125001 * -0.85935 +
Talc powder -0.03724 * -0.84769 +
Sanitary pads -0.08309 * -0.99894 +
Postage for letter, typical -0.55249 -0.9604 *+
Table D.2: Coastal Difference Regression
Goods SR Pass-through LR Pass-through
Rice 0.0003 * 0.0005 *
Oat meal 0.0008 * -0.0003 *
Cereal 0.0005 * 0.0008 *
Spaghetti 0.0001 * -0.0003 *
Bread 0.0005 * 0.0007 *
Beef, with bone 0.0008 * 0.0001 *
Beef, without bone 0.0007 * -0.0004 *
Chicken 0.0007 * 0.0010 *
Shrimp 0.0010 * -0.0003 *
Fish, fresh -0.0002 * -0.0013 *
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Tuna, can 0.0005 * 0.0001 *
Sardines in can 0.0005 * 0.0004 *
Milk, powder 0.0000 * -0.0009 *
Milk, fresh, homogenized/pasteurized 0.0003 * 0.0002 *
Cheese 0.0004 * 0.0011 *
Eggs 0.0008 * 0.0018 *
Oil, vegetable 0.0002 * 0.0001 *
Vegetable fat 0.0008 * 0.0003 *
Margarine -0.0001 * -0.0003 *
Avocado 0.0008 * 0.0004 *
Bananas 0.0004 * -0.0010 *
Lemons 0.0018 * 0.0004 *
Apples 0.0005 * 0.0017 *
Raspberries 0.0005 * 0.0053 *
Oranges 0.0029 * 0.0002 *
Naranjilla 0.0006 * -0.0011 *
Papaya 0.0015 * 0.0004 *
Pineapple 0.0000 * -0.0013 *
Plantain 0.0000 * -0.0025 *
Watermelon 0.0012 * -0.0033 *
Tomatillo 0.0013 * 0.0011 *
Grapes 0.0003 * 0.0016 *
Fruit cocktail, can 0.0007 * 0.0004 *
Raisins 0.0001 * -0.0006 *
Peas, fresh -0.0012 * -0.0026 *
Onion, white -0.0021 * -0.0016 *
Onion, red 0.0006 * -0.0022 *
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Cabbage 0.0003 * -0.0010 *
Cauliflower -0.0010 * -0.0034 *
Corn, fresh -0.0027 -0.0038 *
Broad beans, fresh 0.0018 -0.0014 *
Beans, fresh -0.0002 * 0.0001 *
Lettuce -0.0002 * -0.0061 *
Bell pepper 0.0012 * -0.0061 *
Tomatoes 0.0001 * -0.0035 *
Peas, dry 0.0000 * 0.0004 *
Beans, dry 0.0012 -0.0002 *
Lentils 0.0001 * 0.0008 *
Peanuts 0.0012 * 0.0006 *
Potatoes 0.0002 * 0.0013 *
Yucca -0.0005 * -0.0009 *
Carrots 0.0019 * -0.0022 *
Sugar 0.0000 * -0.0012 *
Chocolate, candy 0.0002 * 0.0001 *
Candy 0.0004 * 0.0004 *
Gelatine 0.0001 * 0.0007 *
Marmalade 0.0003 * 0.0007 *
Honey 0.0005 * 0.0007 *
Panela -0.0002 * -0.0004 *
Garlic -0.0010 * -0.0007 *
Salt 0.0000 * -0.0004 *
Ketchup 0.0007 * -0.0003 *
Broad beans, flour -0.0001 * 0.0000 *
Soup, dry 0.0000 * 0.0010 *
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Coffee, ground 0.0003 * 0.0001 *
Coffee, instant 0.0006 * 0.0012 *
Cocoa 0.0003 * 0.0005 *
Mineral water -0.0002 * 0.0010 *
Soft drink, store 0.0005 * 0.0014 *
Orange juice 0.0000 * 0.0008 *
Soft drink in powder 0.0003 * 0.0006 *
Beer, at store 0.0007 * -0.0013 *
Rum 0.0001 * 0.0013 *
Wine 0.0006 * 0.0007 *
Cigarrettes 0.0004 * 0.0004 *
Cassimere, fabric -0.0001 * 0.0001 *
Chalis, fabric 0.0006 * 0.0009 *
Silk, fabric 0.0007 * -0.0001 *
Dress for woman, making -0.0003 * 0.0005 *
Pants for man, making 0.0004 * 0.0006 *
Suit for man, making -0.0002 * 0.0000 *
Socks, mens 0.0006 * 0.0008 *
Underwear, mens 0.0010 0.0008 *
Shirt, mens 0.0006 * 0.0009 *
T-shirt, mens 0.0002 * 0.0002 *
Pants, mens 0.0009 0.0005 *
Shorts, for sports, mens 0.0002 * 0.0022 *
Suit for men 0.0002 * 0.0007 *
T-shirt, childrens 0.0007 * 0.0004 *
Pants, boys 0.0001 * 0.0001 *
Blouse, womens, typical 0.0004 * 0.0001 *
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Underwear, womens 0.0001 * 0.0005 *
T-shirt, womens 0.0006 * 0.0001 *
Skirt, womens 0.0007 * 0.0016 *
Pantyhose, nylon 0.0012 * 0.0010 *
Pants, womens 0.0008 0.0005 *
Dress, womens 0.0004 * 0.0004 *
Pants, girls 0.0001 * 0.0004 *
Underwear, girls 0.0003 * -0.0002 *
Dress, girls 0.0000 * 0.0001 *
Shirt, babies 0.0006 * 0.0010 *
Suit for baby 0.0000 * 0.0010 *
Shoes, leather, mens 0.0004 * 0.0002 *
Shoes, sneakers, mens 0.0002 * -0.0002 *
Shoes, boys 0.0001 * -0.0003 *
Shoes, leather, womens 0.0006 * 0.0006 *
Shoes, sneakers, womens -0.0001 * -0.0011 *
Shoes, girls 0.0003 * 0.0004 *
Shoe polish 0.0005 * 0.0020 *
Shoe polishing 0.0003 * 0.0006 *
Shoe repair -0.0004 * 0.0001 *
Rent of house, typical 0.0000 * -0.0012 *
Rent of apartment, typical -0.0004 * -0.0001 *
Rent of room, efficiency -0.0001 * -0.0002 *
Water (utility) -0.0008 * -0.0001 *
Electricity 0.0003 * 0.0006 *
Gas, natural, domestic 0.0006 * 0.0046 *
Cupboard, wooden 0.0005 * 0.0003 *
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Bed, wooden 0.0007 * 0.0016 *
Chest of drawers, wooden 0.0004 * 0.0006 *
Dining set 0.0004 * 0.0005 *
Living room set 0.0003 * 0.0007 *
Blanket, thick, very warm 0.0007 * 0.0006 *
Blanket, thick, warm 0.0004 * 0.0001 *
Mattress 0.0005 * 0.0011 *
Blanket, thin 0.0004 * 0.0004 *
Towel 0.0005 * 0.0010 *
Stove, gas 0.0002 * -0.0008 *
Blender 0.0001 * -0.0004 *
Sewing machine 0.0009 * -0.0003 *
Iron, electric 0.0002 * -0.0007 *
Refrigerator 0.0005 * -0.0004 *
Light bulb, typical 0.0004 * 0.0001 *
Pot, cooking 0.0001 * 0.0000 *
Cup with dish 0.0000 * 0.0000 *
Glass 0.0002 * -0.0002 *
Bleach, for laundry 0.0006 * 0.0008 *
Disinfectant, domestic 0.0003 * 0.0004 *
Detergent 0.0005 * -0.0002 *
Broom 0.0003 * 0.0005 *
Matches 0.0008 * 0.0003 *
Soap for dishwashing -0.0013 -0.0002 *
Soap for laundry 0.0002 * -0.0005 *
Toilet Paper 0.0006 * 0.0002 *
Laundry service -0.0002 * 0.0003 *
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Dry cleaning 0.0003 * 0.0014 *
Medicines in general 0.0005 0.0006 *
Aspirin (medicine) 0.0011 * 0.0016 *
Linconcin (medicine) 0.0008 * 0.0019 *
Flagil (medicine) 0.0004 * 0.0008 *
Garamicina (medicine) 0.0002 * 0.0005 *
Neurobion (medicine) 0.0004 * -0.0001 *
Voltaren (medicine) 0.0004 * -0.0002 *
Megacilina (medicine) 0.0003 * 0.0010 *
Apronax (medicine) 0.0000 * 0.0000 *
Redoxon (medicine) 0.0004 * 0.0005 *
Hepabionta (medicine) 0.0000 * -0.0011 *
Milk of magnesia 0.0010 * -0.0005 *
Baycuten, cream (medicine) 0.0010 * -0.0004 *
Comtrex (medicine) 0.0008 * 0.0020 *
Mucosolvan (medicine) 0.0004 * 0.0007 *
Cataflam (medicine) 0.0005 * -0.0008 *
Fungirex (medicine) 0.0004 * 0.0005 *
Imodium (medicine) 0.0008 * -0.0008 *
Acrosin-B (medicine) 0.0008 * 0.0012 *
Glasses 0.0000 * 0.0006 *
Doctors visit -0.0001 * 0.0000 *
Lab test, typical medical 0.0001 * 0.0011 *
Automobile or pick-up truck 0.0002 * -0.0001 *
Bicycle, typical -0.0002 * -0.0008 *
Tire, with tube if needed 0.0000 * 0.0004 *
Automobile tune-up 0.0007 * 0.0008 *
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Gasoline -0.0009 * -0.0022 *
Inter-province trip -0.0006 * -0.0011 *
Transportation, public in bus -0.0004 * -0.0013 *
Taxi, urban -0.0004 * -0.0009 *
Sound system, stereo 0.0006 * -0.0007 *
TV set, color 0.0002 * -0.0003 *
VCR -0.0001 * -0.0010 *
Soccer ball 0.0000 * 0.0014 *
Entertainment, dancing -0.0005 * 0.0007 *
Soccer game 0.0013 * 0.0009 *
Rent of VHS movie 0.0004 * 0.0010 *
Newspaper -0.0006 * 0.0004 *
Magazine 0.0002 * 0.0008 *
Uniform for school 0.0005 * 0.0009 *
Tuition, kindergarden 0.0003 * 0.0011 *
Tuition, primary school 0.0000 * 0.0012 *
Registration, secondary school 0.0001 * 0.0012 *
Tuition, secondary school 0.0001 * 0.0013 *
Registration, university 0.0000 * 0.0003 *
Typewriter 0.0002 * 0.0002 *
School supplies in general 0.0002 * 0.0015 *
Book, primary school (typical) 0.0001 * 0.0016 *
Notebook for primary school 0.0002 * 0.0014 *
Compass, drawing, primary school 0.0002 * 0.0014 *
Ruler, primary school 0.0000 * 0.0015 *
Pen for primary school 0.0002 * 0.0018 *
Notebook for secundary school 0.0001 * 0.0013 *
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Folder 0.0002 * 0.0014 *
Paper, bond 0.0002 * 0.0013 *
Geometry set for school 0.0006 * 0.0011 *
Ruler, secondary school 0.0001 * 0.0014 *
Pen for secundary school 0.0003 * 0.0016 *
Algebra book 0.0002 * 0.0015 *
Dictionary for school 0.0001 * 0.0014 *
Lunch, typical 0.0006 * 0.0014 *
Chicken, rotisserie 0.0005 * 0.0017 *
Soft drink, at bar 0.0003 * 0.0008 *
Beer, at bar 0.0002 * -0.0001 *
Lodging, typical 0.0000 * 0.0012 *
Haircut 0.0001 * 0.0006 *
Cologne 0.0006 * 0.0003 *
Cream, moisturizer 0.0005 * -0.0004 *
Deodorant 0.0005 * 0.0005 *
Soap, deodorant 0.0005 * 0.0008 *
Razor, standard manual 0.0007 * 0.0010 *
Diapers, disposable for children 0.0005 * 0.0011 *
Toothpaste 0.0011 * 0.0013 *
Shampoo -0.0006 * -0.0002 *
Talc powder 0.0002 * -0.0002 *
Sanitary pads 0.0007 * 0.0020 *
Postage for letter, typical 0.0000 * 0.0004 *
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